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INTRODUCTION
One of the most contentious issues in state taxation is the reach
of the states' jurisdiction to tax net income. The failure to resolve
this issue is a leading cause of the recent dramatic decline in state
corporate income tax revenues.' Familiar forces of change are at
work: the ongoing shift from a mercantile to a service economy, 2 the
increasing mobility of capital,3 electronic commerce,4 and the
"coming of age" of state tax planning techniques aggressively
promoted by the national accounting firms.5 These forces allow
corporations to do (or appear to do) business in a state from afar.
Thus, traditional markers of nexus to tax-such as physical
presence-are absent.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not directly answered the
question of whether mere economic presence is a sufficient ground
for a state to assert its income tax jurisdiction. Students of the
1. Corporate income tax revenues declined over thirty percent relative to gross state
product between 1995 and 2002. Michael J. McIntyre, Thoughts on the Future of the State
Corporate Income Tax, 25 ST. TAX NOTES 931,944 fig.1, 945 fig.2 (2002). "The Multistate Tax
Commission (MTC) has estimated that [bletween 1980 and the year 2000, the effective rate
of state corporate income taxes declined nearly by half from 9.6 percent to approximately 5.2
percent...." Dan Bucks & Frank Katz, Explanation of the Multistate Tax Commission's
Proposed Factor Presence Nexus Standard, 25 ST. TAX NOTES 1037, 1039 (2002). The MTC
"further estimates that it is possible to account for only about 20 percent of that decline as
having arisen from explicit statutory decisions of state legislatures ... to cut rates or grant
credits or other reductions ... leav[ing] roughly 80 percent of the decline that is unexplained
by legislative action." Id. The MTC has suggested that one of the "likely candidates for the
causeD of that decline" is state-level "tax sheltering activity," whereby taxpayers shift income
into no or low tax states. Id. See also infra Part III.B.1-2 (explaining income-shifting
opportunities created by a physical presence nexus test).
2. "In 1960, 42 percent of U.S. wages and salaries were earned in the goods-producing
sector" of the economy. Robert Tannenwald, Are State and Local Revenue Systems Becoming
Obsolete?, 24 ST. TAX NOTEs 143, 146 (2002). In 2000, the share had fallen to twenty-four
percent. The portion of personal consumption dollars spent on services rose during this same
period, however, from forty-one percent to fifty-eight percent. Id.
3. See id. at 155.
4. See id. at 153-54; cf William F. Fox, Can the State Sales Tax Survive a Future Like
Its Past?, in THE FUTURE OF STATE TAXATION 33, 41 (David Brunori ed., 1998).
5. See Richard D. Pomp, The Future of the State Corporate Income Tax: Reflections (and
Confessions) of a Tax Lawyer, in THE FUTURE OF STATE TAXATION 49, 50-53 (David Brunori
ed., 1998) (providing a candid and engaging exposition of the "coming of age" of the state and
local tax planning profession).
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Court's due process jurisprudence may find this surprising. The
Court held long ago that economic presence is sufficient for a
plaintiff to hale a foreign corporation into court or for a state to
assert its regulatory jurisdiction.6 The Court's state tax juris-
prudence has taken a different tack, however, riding the winds of
the dormant Commerce Clause into "uncharted and treacherous"
waters.
The voyage began in 1967, when the Court held in National
Bellas Hess v. Department of Revenue8 that a physical presence was
required for a state to impose a use tax collection obligation on a
mail-order company.9 Curiously, the Bellas Hess Court took no note
of its earlier due process decisions affirming state regulatory
jurisdiction based solely on economic presence.'0 Twenty-five years
later in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, under essentially identical
facts, the Court conceded that due process could be satisfied by
economic presence alone. " Nevertheless, the Court reaffirmed the
physical presence test on Commerce Clause grounds alone."
Until that time, the Court had not indicated that the Due Process
and Commerce Clause nexus standards diverged in any meaningful
way." By removing state tax nexus from its due process moorings,
the Court seems to have discarded the traditional source of content
for nexus inquiries (tax or otherwise)." Its replacement-the
6. See, e.g., Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia ex rel. State Corp. Comm'n, 339 U.S. 643,
644-45,651 (1950) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to Virginia's "Blue Sky Law"); McGee
v. Intl Life Ins., 355 U.S. 220, 221,224 (1957) (upholding a California court's jurisdiction over
a foreign insurance company).
7. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 325 (1967) (White, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
8. 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
9. Id. at 758.
10. See Bellas Hess v. Dep't of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967) (failing to reference either
Travelers Health Ass'n or McGee). See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
11. Quill, 504 U.S. at 307-08.
12. See i. at 309-19.
13. For example, whether Bellas Hess rested on Due Process or Commerce Clause grounds
was not a matter of dispute before the Quill decision. See infra note 37 and accompanying
text.
14. Of course a state tax must still satisfy due process, but Quill held that an economic
presence is enough to satisfy this requirement. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
Accordingly, if a state can source income to it, due process usually will be satisfied. A major
exception might be the "inadvertent presence" that could arise, for example, in the case of
remote lessors of tangible personal property, or remote licensors of intangible property, who
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Commerce Clause prohibition against undue burdens-is not well
adapted for this purpose, and offers no rich nexus jurisprudence
that it can call its own.15
Like the Bellas Hess decision, Quill did not expressly address
income tax nexus.16 Indeed, dictum in Quill suggests that the
nexus standard for taxes other than sales and use taxes may not
be physical presence. 7 Thus, Quill seems only to add to the
uncertainty surrounding state income tax jurisdiction. These
uncertainties have materialized in post-Quill state court litigation.
Less than a year after the Quill decision, the South Carolina
Supreme Court held that Quill's physical presence test was not
applicable to state income taxes.18 Courts since then have split.19
Again, uncertainty prevails.20
There is no line of Supreme Court income tax nexus decisions
parallel to Quill. The Court's exploration of the constitutional limits
of income tax jurisdiction has been stymied by the affirmative
have neither practical control over the use of the property nor a reasonable means of tracking
the "movement" of such property. See, e.g., JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN,
1 STATE TAXATION 16.07,6.11 (3d ed. 1998 & Supp. 2002). The concerns raised by taxing an
inadvertent presence, however, are usually also Commerce Clause concerns. See Quill, 504
U.S. at 313 n.7 (stating that taxes that pass Commerce Clause muster will usually pass Due
Process Clause muster). Thus, as a practical matter, most tax nexus disputes will be resolved
by reference to the Commerce Clause standard.
15. As noted, the Court's pre-Quill cases commingled the Due Process and Commerce
Clauses, treating their nexus standards as essentially identical. See supra note 13 and
accompanying text. By decoupling the Commerce and Due Process Clauses, the continuing
authority of these pre-Quill Commerce and Due Process Clause nexus cases can be
questioned. Most likely, Quill simply lowered the due process bar but kept the Commerce
Clause bar in place. Thus, as a general matter, the Court's earlier Due Process and Commerce
Clause nexus cases have continuing vitality as Commerce Clause precedents. See infra Part
I.C.
16. See infra Part I.B.2.b.
17. See infra Part I.B.2.b.
18. Geoffrey, Inc. v. S.C. Tax Comm'n, 437 S.E.2d 13, 18 (S.C. 1993).
19. Compare KMart Props., Inc. v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, No. 21,140 (N.M. Ct. App.
Nov. 27, 2001), cert. granted, 40 P.3d 1008 (N.M. 2002), available at LEXIS 2001 STT 233-18
(holding that Quill is not applicable to income taxes), with Rylander v. Bandag Licensing
Corp., 18 S.W.3d 296, 300 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000) (finding "no principled distinction" between
franchise taxes and sales and use taxes). See infra Part I.C.2.e. (discussing post-Quill state
court income tax nexus cases).
20. See, e.g., HELLESTEJiN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 14, 6.02 (noting that the
applicability of Quill to income taxes is unclear); RIcHARD D. POMP & OLIVER OLDMAN, 2
STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 10-25 to 10-26 (4th ed. 2001) (discussing plausible alternative
interpretations of Quill and suggesting that either Congress or the Court ultimately will be
called upon to resolve the ambiguity).
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exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause powers. In 1959, Congress
statutorily curtailed the states' power to impose a net income tax on
sellers of tangible personal property whose in-state activities do not
exceed mere "solicitation."' Though intended as a temporary
measure-allowing Congress to study the ramifications of several
judicial decisions that were perceived to have expanded state
income tax jurisdiction-the statute remains on the books to this
day.22 Indeed, state and local tax professionals still refer to the
21. 15 U.S.C. § 381 (2000). The statute provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Minimum standards
No State, or political subdivision thereof, shall have power to impose, for any
taxable year ending after September 14, 1959, a net income tax on the income
derived within such State by any person from interstate commerce if the only
business activities within such State by or on behalf of such person during such
taxable year are either, or both, of the following-
(1) the solicitation of orders by such person, or his representative, in such State
for sales of tangible personal property, which orders are sent outside the State
for approval or rejection, and, if approved, are filled by shipment or delivery
from a point outside the State; amd
(2) the solicitation of orders by such person, or his representative, in such State
in the name of or for the benefit of a prospective customer of such person, if
orders by such customer to such person to enable such customer to fill orders
resulting from such solicitation are orders described in paragraph (1).
(c) Sales or solicitation of orders for sales by independent contractors
For purposes of subsection (a) of this section, a person shall not be considered
to have engaged in business activities within a State during any taxable year
merely by reason of sales in such State, or the solicitation of orders for sales in
such State, of tangible personal property on behalf of such person by one or more
independent contractors, or by reason of the maintenance, of an office in such
State by one or more independent contractors whose activities on behalf of such
person in such State sauast solely of making sales, or soliciting orders for sales,
of tangible personal property.
Id.
22. See id. In Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959),
the Court sustained the states' power to impose a non-discriminatory, fairly apportioned net
income tax on exclusively iaterstate businesses. Id. at 452. In response:
[There was) widespread alarm and protest among businesses. There were
predictions of the most dire consequences to business and, indeed, the entire
nation. Two Senate Committees promptly held hearings, and there was
vociferous demand for immediate congressional action. Congress reacted with
astonishing speed and, for the firs time in its history, adopted an act restricting
the states' power to tax interstate businesses.
HELLERSTEiN & HEuEam'N, supra note 14,1 6.16 (citations omitted). The House Committee
on the Judiciary formed the Special Subcommittee on State Taxation of Interstate Commerce,
commonly known as the Willis Committee, to study the issue, but the Willis Committee's
report resulted neither in further legislation nor the repeal of P.L. 86-272. See H.R. REP. No.
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measure as P.L. 86-272, despite having been incorporated into the
United States Code.23
P.L. 86-272 provides a safe harbor for sellers of tangible personal
property, but it says nothing about services or intangibles.2 Thus,
as the service sector of the economy continues to expand, so too does
corporate concern about exposure to state income taxes. Further, as
technological advances permit more businesses to provide goods and
services from remote locations, policymakers fear that jurisdictional
rules based on an anachronistic physical presence test threaten the
tax base and provide inappropriate tax avoidance opportunities. 25 At
the same time, many of the growing number of firms that do
business remotely resist the notion that they should be liable for
taxes imposed by geographically distant jurisdictions.26
Two conflicting proposals reflect this resurgence of concern over
the state income tax. Taxing authorities have proposed a "factor
presence standard" that would allow a state to tax an economically
present business so long as the business' in-state sales meet a
certain threshold.2 ' Business taxpayers, on the other hand, are
backing legislation that would expand P.L. 86-272's safe harbor to
cover services, intangibles, and numerous other in-state contacts
88-1480 (1964); H.R. REP. No. 89-565 (1965); H.R. REP. No. 89-952 (1965).
23. This Article follows this custom, referring to 15 U.S.C. § 381 as P.L. 86-272.
24. See supra note 21.
25. See, e.g., Bucks & Katz, supra note 1, at 1010 (arg g that "[t]he extent of corporate
tax sheltering is a major problem in our society).
26. See, e.g., Scott D. Smith & Sharlene Amitay, Economic Nexus: An Unworkable
Standard for Jurisdiction, 25 ST. TAxNOTsS 787, 787 (2002)(contending that economic nexus
is "incompatible with fundamental constitutional requirements*).
27. See infra notes 194-200 and accompanying text.
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that go far beyond the "mere solicitation" protection of the current
statute.28 Sparks have flown.29
28. See Internet Tax Fairness Act of 2001, H.R. 2526, 107th Cong. (2001). In addition to
the in-state activities protected by P.L. 86-272, it would exclude:
(3) The presence or use of intangible personal property in such State or
subdivision, including patents, copyrights, trademarks, logos, securities,
contracts, licenses and permits issued by any governmental agency or authority
authorizing the holder to conduct any business activity, money, deposits, loans,
electronic or digital signals, and web pages, whether or not subject to licenses,
franchises, or other agreements.
(4) The use of the Internet to create or maintain a World Wide Web site
accessible by persons in such State or subdivision.
(5) The use of an Internet service provider, on-line service provider,
internetwork communication service provider, or other Internet access service
provider, or World Wide Web hosting services to maintain or take and process
orders via a web page or site on a computer that is physically located in such
State or subdivision.
(6) The use of any service provider for transmission of communications,
whether by cable, satellite, radio, telecommunications, or other similar system.
(7) The leasing or owning of substantial property in such State or subdivision
for less than 30 days. Property in such State or subdivision for purposes of being
assembled, manufactured, processed, or tested by a person or persons within
such State or subdivision for the benefit of the owner or lessee, or used to
furnish a service by a person or persons within such State or subdivision to the
owner or lessee, shall be disregarded in determining whether such 30-day limit
has been exceeded.
(8) The assigning of employees, representatives, or agents in such State or
subdivision for less than 30 days. Presence of employees, representatives or
agents for purposes directly relating to the purchasing [sic] goods or services,
gathering news and covering events, meeting with government officials,
attending conferences, seminars and similar functions, and participating in
charitable activities shall be disregarded in determining whether such 30-day
limit has been exceeded.
(9) The affiliation with another person located in the State or subdivision,
unless-
(A) the other person located in the State or subdivision is the person's agent
under the terms and conditions of subsection (d); and
(B) the activity of the other person in the State or subdivision constitutes
substantial physical presence under this subsection and is performed to
establish, enhance, or maintain the market in the State or subdivision for the
person.
(10) The use of an unaffiliated representative or independent contractor in such
State or subdivision for the purpose of performing warranty or repair services
with respect to tangible or intangible personal property sold by a person located
outside the State or subdivision.
Id. at 4-6 (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted). The proposed legislation would also
include special rules preventing the attribution of certain activities of third parties to the
taxpayer and would extend the coverage of P.L. 86-272 beyond net income taxes to all
"business activity taxes.* See id. at 3.
29. The passions that the nexus controversy arouses confirm that the stakes are indeed
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The purpose of this Article is twofold: first, to identify the
constitutional nexus standard for state income tax; second, to
evaluate whether the constitutional standard reflects good tax
policy. Part I discusses the relevant authorities and constitutional
framework. The centerpiece of the discussion is Quill. In recognition
of the varied approaches that commentators have taken to Quill,
"Burdens Quill," "Stare Decisis Quill," and "Disappearing Ink Quill"
interpretations are developed. Of equal importance are the income
tax nexus cases that preceded Quill. The Court's combined reporting
cases also provide some illumination, and the post-Quill state court
income tax decisions are briefly discussed.
Part II applies the authorities discussed in Part I to the question
of state income tax jurisdiction. Are they controlling? Are they
relevant, and how? Is physical presence required? If not, then what
is the Commerce Clause standard? The constitutional inquiry is
based on existing precedent. The authorities are critiqued as well as
explained, but it is the explanations on which the legal reasoning is
grounded.
Part III applies the basic tenets of good tax policy-equity,
efficiency, and administrability-to the competing nexus standards
of economic and physical presence. This normative inquiry is
important because Congress has the authority to establish a nexus
standard by exercise of its affirmative Commerce Clause powers,
and because tax policy norms should inform the dormant Commerce
Clause analysis of future Courts.
high. Illustrative is a published debate between Frank Katz, General Counsel of the
Multistate Tax Commission, and Arthur R. Rosen, a high-profile tax attorney with the
business law firm of McDermott, Will & Emery. Doug Sheppard et al., Shining a Blue Light
on Nexus: Katz and Rosen Debate the Kmart Decision, 23 ST. TAX NOTES 847 (2002). Katz
expresses "outrage" at the "mischief ... of tax planning schemes hawked by Big 5 accounting
firms" and compares these "scam[s]" to tactics employed by Enron. Id. at 848, 852. Rosen
complains that"state [tax] departments are experimenting with overly aggressive techniques,
legally tortuous approaches, and 'sledgehammer' methods to address what they view as
loopholes.- Id. at 850.
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I. THE AUTHORITIES
A. The Complete Auto Test and Substantial Nexus
The Court has held that a state tax passes dormant Commerce
Clause muster if it (1) is assessed against a taxpayer with whom the
state has substantial nexus,3" (2) is "fairly apportioned,"31 (3) is non-
discriminatory, and (4) is "fairly related to the services provided by
the State."32 The elements of this test were articulated in Complete
Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, although it took later decisions to
enshrine Complete Auto as the definitive four-pronged test for the
validity of a state tax under the dormant Commerce Clause.33
Further, none of these elements were new to the Court's state tax
jurisprudence at the time Complete Auto was decided, although
earlier treatments of the nexus, fair apportionment, and fairly
related prongs of the test were often rooted in Due Process rather
than dormant Commerce Clause analysis.34
The focus of this Article is the nexus prong of the Complete Auto
test. However, "nexus" carries two distinct meanings for state tax
jurisdiction: (1) nexus with the taxpayer and (2) nexus with the
income, transaction, activity or property sought to be taxed.35 It is
probably more analytically precise to treat the second nexus
definition-nexus with the income or transaction sought to be
30. Sometimes the nexus prong of the test is articulated in a way suggesting that it
addresses both nexus with the taxpayer and nexus with the income, activity, property or
transaction sought to be taxed. For the sake of analytical clarity, and because this Article
focuses on jurisdiction over the taxpayer, the nexus test is restated here to capture only the
idea of taxpayer nexus. In Quill, discussed at length below, the Court seized upon Complete
Auto's occasional, though inconsistent, reference to the nexus requirement as "substantial
nexus" as a means to distinguish "the due process 'minimum contacts' test" from "the
Commerce Clause 'substantial nexus' test." See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298,
312-13 (1992). Complete Auto is dubious authority for that leap-nexus was not an issue in
Complete Auto because the taxpayer plainly was doing business in the state. See Complete
Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 276-78 (1977). Nonetheless, the Court has spoken.
31. Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279.
32. Id.
33. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 311.
34. See, e.g., Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 452
(1959) (upholding net income tax on nexus, fair apportionment, non-discrimination, and
benefits received grounds). The Northwestern States Court treated nexus and fair
apportionment as due process issues. Id. at 464-65.
35. HELLERsTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 14, 1 6.01.
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taxed-as a fair apportionment issue.' This Article specifically
addresses jurisdiction over the taxpayer, and so references to
"nexus" mean "nexus with the taxpayer" unless otherwise indi-
cated.37
B. Quill and Its Implications for State Income Tax Jurisdiction
Although a sales and use tax case, Quill Corp. v. North Dakota31
takes center stage because (1) it is the Supreme Court's most recent
pronouncement on state taxjurisdiction and (2) the Court decoupled
Due Process Clause nexus from Commerce Clause nexus. In Quill,
the Court revisited the question it had addressed twenty-five years
earlier under substantially identical facts: May a state compel a
mail-order company to collect use tax from its customers if the
company's contacts with the state are limited to the use of the U.S.
mail and common carriers? 9 In the earlier case, National Bellas
Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue,' the Court answered in the
negative, citing both the Due Process and Commerce Clauses. 1 In
Quill, the Court again answered in the negative, but on Commerce
Clause and stare decisis grounds alone. 2
36. For example, the state of Arizona may have nexus with Acme Copper Company, but
it could not impose a severance tax measured by the copper that Acme extracts in Chile. The
question in this example is not whether Acme has Arizona nexus-it clearly does-but
whether the object or measure of the tax may be fairly apportioned to Arizona, i.e., whether
the severance of Chilean copper has an Arizona nexus. See id. (treating nexus with income as
an apportionment issue for analytical and organizational clarity).
37. Still, the concepts are closely related. If the income or activities of a taxpayer have
nexus with a state then the probability that the taxpayer also has nexus increases greatly.
38. 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
39. Id.
40. 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
41. See id. at 756. The taxpayer challenged the tax on both Due Process and Commerce
Clause grounds. Whether the Court relied on both clauses is unclear, though it appears that
the Court treated these considerations as essentially identical. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 305
(treating Bellas Hess unequivocally as both a Commerce Clause and a Due Process Clause
authority).
42. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 318.
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1. Due Process Quill
Regarding due process, the Court observed that its "jurisprudence
has evolved substantially in the 25 years since Bellas Hess."43 In a
modern economy "it matters little that [I solicitation is accomplished
by a deluge of catalogs rather than a phalanx of drummers: The
requirements of due process are met irrespective of a corporation's
lack of physical presence in the taxing State."" The Court then
expressly overruled its earlier'cases "to the extent that [they] have
indicated that the Due Process Clause requires physical presence in
a State for the imposition of duty to collect a use tax."45 In effect, the
Court applied the minimum contacts test found in International
Shoe v. Washington~and its progeny.
2. Quill and the Commerce Clause
Quill Corporation fared better under the Commerce Clause. The
Court held that the North Dakota use tax collection statute imposed
an unconstitutional burden on commerce because Quill did not have
a physical presence in the state.47 Obviously, the Court then felt
obliged to distinguish Due Process Clause nexus from Commerce
Clause nexus, although three concurring justices were content to
adhere to Bellas Hess on stare decisis grounds alone. 4'
43. Id. at 307.
44. Id. at 308.
45. Id.
46. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). It was in International Shoe that the Court first clearly
enunciated the modern due process test for personal jurisdiction: a defendant must have
"minimum contacts" with the forum such that assertion of jurisdiction "does not offend
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."' Id. at 316 (quoting Millikenv. Meyer,
311 U.S. 457,463(1940)). Interestingly, International Shoe was a tax case involving the power
of the State of Washington to assert its unemployment compensation tax. The concurring
justices in Quill caution that the standard for "legislative (or prescriptive) jurisdiction" may
not be the same as the standard for judicial jurisdiction, but agree that physical presence is
not required for either. Quill, 504 U.S. at 319-20 (Scalia, J., concurring). See Richard D. Pomp,
Are the Standards for Tax Jurisdiction and Personal Jurisdiction Identical?, 54 TAX NOTES
333, 333 (1992) (discussing this distinction in anticipation of the Quill decision).
47. Quill, 504 U.S. at 317-18.
48. Justices Kennedy and Thomas joined the concurrence written by Justice Scalia. Id.
at 319-21 (Scalia, J., concurring).
330 [Vol. 45:319
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The Commerce Clause portion of the decision has been the focus
of intense analysis and debate.4 Here, we begin by summarizing the
Court's two principal rationales for its Commerce Clause ruling: (a)
stare decisis and (b) burden on interstate commerce. 50 Next, the
direct applicability of Quill to state corporate income tax nexus is
addressed.5 Finally, a critique of Quill is offered in which the
"Three Faces of Quill" are identified. 2
a. Quill's Commerce Clause Rationales
(1) Stare Decisis and the Court's Apologetic Tone
For many commentators, stare decisis is the crux of the Quill
decision.53 They caution that the Court's other rationales should not
"be taken very seriously." 4 Indeed, the three concurring justices
seem to take us aside and whisper this sentiment.5
49. See, e.g., Jerome R. Hellerstein, The Quill Case: What the States Can Do to Undo the
Effects of the Decision, 58 TAX NOTES 791 (1993); David F. Shores, State Taxation of Interstate
Commerce: Quill, Allied Signal and a Proposal, 72 NEB. L. REV. 682 (1993); Pamela M. Krill,
Note, Quill Corp. v. North Dakota: Tax Nexus Under the Due Process and Commerce Clauses
No Longer the Same, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 1405 (1993). Professors Pomp and McIntyre note the
zeal of some of the debate participants. See Richard D. Pomp & Michael J. McIntyre, State
Taxation of Mail-Order Sales of Computers After QuilL" An Evaluation of MTC Bulletin 95-1,
11 ST. TAX NOTES 177, 178 (1996) (noting "shrill and angry" criticisms of a proposed rule that
would treat computer warranty work done by independent contractors as creating physical
presence under Quill).
50. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 317-18. The Court also discusses the value of a bright-line test.
Much of this discussion is connected either with its burdens analysis or its stare decisis
analysis, and so the bright-line test will be addressed in connection with those rationales. At
times, the Court appears to treat the bright-line test as intrinsically valuable. See infra Part
I.B.2.
51. The application of the rationales of Quill to state corporate income tax nexus is
considered in Part I.B.2.b.
52. See infra Part I.B.2.c.
53. See HELLERSTEIN & HEiLERSTEIN, supra note 14, I 6.02(2) (arguing that the Court
relied on stare decisis rather than defending the physical presence test on the merits); Pomp
& McIntyre, supra note 49, at 179-80 (quoting Charles Rothfield, Quill: Confusing the
Commerce Clause, 3 ST. TAX NOTES 111, 115 (1992)) (arguing that Quill is essentially "a
political decision" responding to concerns about retroactivity and the practical consequences
of overruling Bellas Hess).
54. Rothfield, supra note 53, at 115.
55. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (noting that the concurrence would have
decided Quill on stare decisis grounds alone).
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The doctrine of stare decisis provides that courts will adhere to
existing precedent and not disturb settled points. This is a bedrock
principle of law. If the rules determined in earlier disputes were not
applied to subsequent disputes, then people would have little
guidance on how to structure their affairs. Applying this doctrine to
Quill, the result was inevitable, given that in Bellas Hess the Court
had previously decided a case that was practically indistinguishable
on the facts.
Of course, the law must also allow for change. Even the most
casual observer knows that the Supreme Court will overrule
existing precedent. But how does the Court decide when a change
in the law is appropriate? The Court has identified four factors that
it considers: (1) whether there has been significant change in related
principles of law; (2) whether there has been a change in the factual
milieu (social, economic, cultural, technological, and so on); (3)
whether the old rule has become unworkable; and (4) whether there
are strong reliance interests in the old rule that would be harmed
by a change. 6 No one factor is controlling.
The first two factors might be called the "legal factors." All first
year law students know that cases are decided by the law and the
facts. If these remain unchanged, reliance on earlier authority is
plainly appropriate. The second two factors-the workability of the
old rule and reliance interests-might be called the "pragmatic
factors," and reliance on these factors alone might be called "naked
stare decisis." When these two factors are in play, pragmatism and
conservatism are balanced against strict adherence to the "right"
legal result.
In overruling the due process aspect of Bellas Hess, the Court
relied on the legal factors.5 7 Bellas Hess had been "superceded by
developments in the law of due process." 8 The Court also ac-
knowledged that there had been substantial changes in the nation's
economy since Bellas Hess was decided.59 Because Quill ultimately
retained the old rule-now on Commerce Clause grounds alone-
the Court had no cause to consider the pragmatic factors (the
56. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 1 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 239-40 (3d ed. 2000).
57. Quill, 504 U.S. at 308.
58. Id.
59. See id.; see also supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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workability of the physical presence test and the reliance interest of
the mail-order industry) in rendering its due process decision.
Predictably, the pragmatic factors spearheaded the Court's
refusal to upset the Commerce Clause aspect of Bellas Hess. First,
the Court endorsed the continued workability of the old rule.
Retaining the bright-line physical presence test "establishes the
boundaries of legitimate state authority,"' "reduces litigation,"'
"encourages settled expectations,"62 and "fosters investment by
businesses.' 3 Second, the Court found that "the Bellas Hess
rule has engendered substantial reliance and has become part of
the basic framework of a sizeable industry."' Moreover, overruling
Bellas Hess "might raise thorny questions concerning the retro-
active application of those taxes and might trigger substantial
unanticipated liability for mail-order houses."5 Accordingly, "the
doctrine of stare decisis ... counsels adherence to settled prece-
dent."6
Because of its reliance on "naked stare decisis," the Quill
decision took on an apologetic tone. The Court acknowledged that
"contemporary Commerce Clause jurisprudence might not dictate
the same result were the issue to arise for the first time today."67
Specifically, "our Commerce Clause jurisprudence now favors more
flexible balancing analyses,"8 and the bright-line Bellas Hess
test "appears artificial at its edges." 9 The Court concluded that it
may be best to leave the issue for Congress to resolve under its
affirmative Commerce Clause powers "even if we were convinced
that Bellas Hess was inconsistent with our Commerce Clause
jurisprudence."70 Thus, by removing any due process barriers to
60. Quill, 504 U.S. at 315.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 316.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 317.
65. Id. at 318 n.1O.
66. Id. at 317.
67. Id. at 311.
68. Id. at 314.
69. Id. at 315.
QO. Id. at 318.
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Congressional action in the first part of the opinion, the Court left
the matter at Congress's doorstep, "at least for now."7
(2) Undue Burden on Interstate Commerce
Three concurring justices would have left matters there, declining
to "revisit the merits of [Bellas Hess], but ... adher[ing] to it on the
basis of stare decisis."72 The majority, however, sought to develop an
independent jurisprudential rationale for the rule.
The Court observed that "the nexus requirements of the Due
Process and Commerce Clauses ... are animated by different
constitutional concerns,"73 though it conceded that "we have not
always been precise in distinguishing between the two."74 Due
process is informed by concerns about "fair warning" and "notice."75
In contrast, the Commerce Clause addresses "structural concerns
about the effects of state regulation on the national economy."76
Accordingly, "[a] tax may be consistent with due process and yet
unduly burden interstate commerce."77 The Court then reifies
the phrase "substantial nexus," which appeared inconsistently in
Complete Auto, and distinguished it from the "minimum contacts"
required by due process.7" Substantial sales and use tax nexus
requires a physical presence; minimum contacts analysis does not.79
The Quill Court's explanation of how a physical presence test
furthers Commerce Clause values was thin. It did not claim that
sales and use taxes themselves are burdensome. The Court was
concerned with the administrative costs of tax compliance. The
Court explained in a footnote:
North Dakota's use tax illustrates well how a state tax might
unduly burden interstate commerce. On its face, North Dakota
law imposes a collection duty on every vendor who advertises in
71. Id.
72. Id. at 320 (Scalia, J., concurring).
73. Id. at 312.
74. Id. at 305.
75. Id. at 312.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 314 n.7.
78. Id at 313.
79. See id. at 308.
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the State three times in a single year. Thus, absent the Bellas
Hess rule, a publisher who included a subscription card in three
issues of its magazine, a vendor whose radio advertisements
were heard in North Dakota on three occasions, and a
corporation whose telephone sales force made three calls into the
State, all would be subject to the collection duty. What is more
significant, similar obligations might be imposed by the Nation's
6,000-plus taxingjurisdictions. See National Bellas Hess, Inc. v.
Department of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753, 759-60 (1967)
(noting that the "many variations in rates of tax, in allowable
exemptions, and in administrative and record-keeping
requirements could entangle [a mall-order house] in a virtual
welter of complicated obligations").'
How a physical presence test reduces the burden is not appar-
ent from the Court's discussion. It is difficult to argue, for example,
that Quill Corporation's compliance burden would be less if it
periodically sent sales representatives into the state, or had a small
office in Sioux Falls. Physical presence marks how one does
business in a state, not how much.
Perhaps sensing this problem, most of the Court's discussion
centers on the value of a bright-line test."' Many of the bright-line
test justifications focused on stare decisis concerns, already con-
sidered above. 2 Remarkably, the Court also championed the bright-
line test because it "demar[ks] ... a discrete realm of commercial
activity that is free from interstate taxation."' However, the free
trade zone approach to Commerce Clause jurisprudence had long
since been rejected by the Court: "It was not the purpose of the
Commerce Clause to relieve those engaged in interstate commerce
from their just share of [the] state tax burden even though it
increases the cost of doing business."84 Another value of the bright-
line test posited by the Court is that it gives clear notice to
taxpayers that they are subject to a state's jurisdiction to tax.85
80. Id. at 313 n.6 (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
81. See id. at 314-17.
82. See supra Part I.B.2.a.1.
83. Quill, 504 U.S. at 315.
84. Id. at 310 n.5 (alteration in original) (quoting Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana,
453 U.S. 609, 623-24 (1981)).
85. See id. at 315 ("Such a rule firmly establishes the boundaries of legitimate state
authority to impose a duty to collect sales and use taxes and reduces litigation concerning
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However, this has the ring of a due process notice concern, and the
Court had already satisfied itself that physical presence is not
required for adequate notice.
Though not clearly stated, the Court's underlying concern seems
to be that businesses with a low sales volume in multiple states may
have compliance costs that are excessive compared to the amount
of business done in those states and to the taxes that would be
collected. "[Miore significant [ly],"' this problem is compounded by
the multiplicity of taxing jurisdictions and the lack of uniformity in
the tax rules and their administration. 7 Manifesting this concern
is the Court's focus on "the little guy"--businesses that meet the
bare minimum of solicitations (with presumably a correspondingly
small sales volume)-and the Court's acknowledgment that state
sales and use taxes are not unconstitutionally burdensome as
applied to all taxpayers, merely remote vendors.' The Court
acknowledged that physical presence is "artificial at its edges," 9 but
the Court indicated its belief that the test will have the effect of
protecting smaller vendors.' That it may, but it also protects large
vendors who are not unduly burdened. Artificiality emerges here,
although more than around the "edges."
We might sympathize with the Court because it is not well
equipped to make quantitative distinctions. The Court could not
reasonably adopt a rule under the dormant Commerce Clause that
provides, for example, that a vendor with fewer than fifteen sales or
a sales volume of less than $1000 in a state is not required to collect
sale or use tax. This is a legislative rule. Instead, courts usually are
limited to using qualitative or linguistic distinctions (for example,
physical presence) as surrogates for more finely tuned legislation. 91
The Court acknowledges these limitations by referring the matter
to Congress.92
those taxes.").
86. Id. at 313 n.6.
87. See id.
88. See id. at 313. The Court acknowledged this concern in its holding, which allowed
sales and use taxation of physically present vendors, but not remote vendors. Id.
89. Id. at 315.
90. See id.
91. Courts also use the "de minimis" concept-a quantitative idea-to draw lines.
92. By removing the Due Process Clause objection to taxing remote vendors, the Court
believed it had cleared the way for Congress to exercise its affirmative Commerce Clause
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b. Applicability to Corporate Income Taxes
Quill's holding does not apply directly to corporate income taxes:
In sum, although in our cases subsequent to Bellas Hess and
concerning other types of taxes we have not adopted a similar
bright-line, physical-presence requirement, our reasoning in
those cases does not compel that we now reject the rule that
Bellas Hess established in the area of sales and use taxes. To the
contrary, the continuing value of a bright-line rule in this area
and the doctrine and principles of stare decisis indicate that the
Bellas Hess rule remains good law."3
In addition, the Court painstakingly limited its analysis
throughout the opinion to sales and use taxes. For example, early in
the Commerce Clause portion of the opinion, the Court used
language almost identical to that of its holding: "Although we have
not, in our review of other types of taxes, articulated the same
physical-presence requirement that Bellas Hess established for sales
and use taxes, that silence does not imply repudiation of the Bellas
Hess rule."' Of course the failure to articulate a physical presence
test in connection with other taxes does not mean that one might
not be found. But neither the Bellas Hess rule nor Quill's
reaffirmation of that rule resolved this issue.
Still, Quill is relevant to the income tax nexus inquiry. Quill's
decoupling of the nexus requirements for the Due Process and
Commerce Clauses, its discussion of the values underlying the
substantial nexus test, and its grounding in stare decisis all inform
this inquiry. The applicability of the rationales of Quill to corporate
income tax nexus is considered in Part II.
c. The Three Faces of Quill: A Critique
Because the focus of this Article is on identifying the nexus
standard for corporate income taxes under existing law, a complete
powers and encouraged Congress to act. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 318-19.
93. Id. at 317 (emphasis added).
94. Id. at 314.
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critique of Quill is not offered here. Nevertheless, a critical
evaluation of Quill assists in assessing the applicability of the case
and its substantial nexus requirement to state corporate income tax
nexus.
For the purposes of analysis, "Three Faces of Quill" are posited:
(1) Stare Decisis Quill, (2) Burdens Quill, and (3) Disappearing Ink
Quill. These approaches are not mutually exclusive, and the three
faces of Quill must be considered in unison in the final analysis.
Nevertheless, the practical implications of Quill for future nexus
disputes hinge largely on which face is found to predominate.
(1) Stare Decisis Quill
As noted, many commentators believe that stare decisis is the
true face of Quill.95 The Court was concerned about the reliance
interest of the mail-order industry and found workable the rule on
which that industry had relied. The Court's emphasis of these
pragmatic stare decisis factors is subject to criticism. Most
obviously, by emphasizing the pragmatic factors it necessarily de-
emphasized the two stare decisis factors that pulled in the opposite
direction-'wholesale changes' in both the economy and the law.' 9
The Court's apologetic tone is the result of this tug of war.
The weight the Quill Court gave to the reliance and bright-line
test factors can also be questioned. For example, does the mail-order
industry truly have a reasonable reliance interest in not collecting
or paying a tax that competitors are required to pay? In addition,
the Court observed that the mail-order industry had experienced
"dramatic growth over the last quarter century."97 Was special
tax treatment, therefore, necessary to the continued survival of a
vibrant industry, however helpful such treatment may have been in
its infancy?9s More generally, do taxpayers have a reliance interest
in tax laws not changing, at least prospectively? Finally, though the
Court expressed concern over the retroactive effects of overruling
95. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
96. Quill, 504 U.S. at 303 (quoting the North Dakota Supreme Court's decision below, 470
N.W.2d 203,213 (N.D. 1991)).
97. Id at 316.
98. An infant industry would seem to have a greater claim to detrimental reliance
concerns than would an established, vibrant industry.
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Bellas Hess, legal doctrines are available to prevent such harm
when the law changes unexpectedly. 9 The remedy is not to per-
petuate an antiquated rule.
The bright-line physical presence test is indeed workable for the
mail-order industry. The Quill opinion, however, fails to consider
the negative consequences of the rule for competing businesses
and for state governments. These countervailing burdens are
considerable. The physical presence test puts physically present
businesses at a competitive disadvantage by tilting the economic
playing field in favor of mail-order businesses."° Further, the test
reduces state tax collections and encourages businesses to
artificially structure themselves to avoid tax,10 1 harming the overall
efficiency of the national economy--certainly a Commerce Clause
consideration. Moreover, the Court probably overstated the extent
to which the bright-line test decreases uncertainty over tax
jurisdiction and resulting litigation. In the mail-order context, due
process and existing sales and use tax statutes would require
payment of taxes to the jurisdiction where the goods are shipped.
This is a fairly bright-line rule itself, and comports more with
economic reality. °2
(2) Burdens Quill: Is Quill a Tax Case?
Despite the admonition of the concurring justices, the majority
sought to offer a substantive jurisprudential rationale for adhering
to the Bellas Hess rule. In order to do so, it had to sever Due Process
Clause nexus from Commerce Clause nexus. It is here that the
doctrinal contortionism begins.
Recall the four-pronged Complete Auto test: (1) nexus, (2) fair
apportionment, (3) non-discrimination, and (4) fair relation to
benefits afforded by the state.' ° An attorney or law school student
99. See Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 105-06 (noting that a "new principle of law"
may be denied retroactive effect to avoid injustice or hardship). See generally TRIBE, supra
note 56, at 218-27 (discussing retroactivity of judicial decisions).
100. See infra Part IA (discussing tax policy goals of horizontal equity, neutrality, and
efficiency).
101. See infra Part III.B.2.
102. Compare a destination-based sales and use nexus test with the MTC's income tax
factor nexus proposal. See infra note 340 and accompanying text.
103. See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
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uninitiated in the niceties of Commerce Clause tax jurisprudence
would quickly ask two questions: First, are not the nexus, fair
apportionment, and fair relation prongs largely due process
concerns?3 4 Second, where is the prohibition against undue, but
non-discriminatory, burdens?
These questions would arise because, outside the state tax area,
the Court has held that the dormant Commerce Clause limits state
regulation of interstate commerce by prohibiting undue burdens. 05
Burdens are of two general types: discriminatory and non-
discriminatory.' 6 Issues of nexus, fair apportionment, and benefits
received are usually relegated to due process analysis.'07
The prohibition against discriminatory regulation operates
much the same as in Commerce Clause tax jurisprudence: Facial
discriminatory statutes are almost automatically struck down,
and litigants also may show that the suspect regulation is dis-
criminatory in effect."° The Court's regulatory dormant Commerce
Clause jurisprudence also allows litigants to challenge a state
regulation that is unduly burdensome on interstate commerce even
though residents are subject to the same regulation."° Here,
however, the Court weighed the legitimate benefits of the regulation
to the state against the burdens on interstate commerce."0 Lack of
uniformity is often a concern, although not the sort of uniformity
that concerned the Quill Court. Rather, regulatory burdens
cases typically involve a state regulation that is out of sync with
neighboring states, or with states nationwide. A leading case
involved an Iowa statute limiting semi-trailers to a length that was
104. It might be explained to the "novice" at this point that fair apportionment serves to
prevent multiple taxation, an obvious burden on interstate commerce. Still our novice might
insist that this concern would be covered by a prohibition against undue burden or
discrimination.
105. Cf. BORIS I. BITmca, BrrIrKER ON THE REGULATION OF INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN
COMMERCE § 6.05, at 6-31 (1999 & Supp. 2003) (discussing S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel.
Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 (1945)).
106. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312 (1992) (noting that the dormant
Commerce Clause "prohibits discrimination" against interstate commerce and "bars state
regulations that unduly burden interstate commerce").
107. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
108. See BITrKER, supra note 105, § 6.06.
109. Often the language of discrimination is used in these cases as well, but it is the
"discrimination" caused by the burden on interstate commerce, not by disparate treatment.
110. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
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not customary elsewhere."' The effect of this regulation was to
cause trucks on interstate journeys to circumnavigate Iowa.12 The
Court found that the Iowa statute burdened interstate commerce
and provided no offsetting benefit to the state other than certain
inappropriate local advantages."'
These regulatory cases have been all or nothing propositions:
either the statute is burdensome or it is not. The Court has not, in
these cases, tried to create a safe harbor for smaller players while
leaving the regulation in effect for others. Further, the Court has
not generally struck down a state statute because the laws of
all states are in discord. Statutory variation has been accepted as
a natural consequence of our federal system. Problems of this
nature can be (and have been) addressed by Congress's affirmative
Commerce Clause powers.
Returning to our "uninitiated" attorney or law student, their
questions would have been answered before the Quill decision as
follows: Regarding the constitutional underpinnings of the nexus
prong, not to worry, the Court has treated the Due Process and
Commerce Clause concerns as essentially equivalent. Regarding the
absence of a rule prohibiting a burdensome but non-discriminatory
tax, the Court has implicitly determined that there is no such thing.
The Court is not in the business of evaluating the economic burden
of a state tax liability.11 4
With this reconciliation of the pre-Quill regulatory and tax
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence in mind, we now turn to
Quill. Here, the Court is not concerned with the economic impact of
the tax liability, but with the compliance burden of reporting tax to
multiple jurisdictions with non-uniform tax rules. Strictly speaking,
Quill is a regulatory burdens case, not a tax case. Indeed, because
due process jurisprudence would no longer countenance the Bellas
Hess physical presence rule, the Court was compelled to consider
111. Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981). The Quill Court cited Kassel
as an example of a case implementing the burdensome protections of the dormant Commerce
Clause. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 312.
112. Kassel, 450 U.S. at 678.
113. Id. at 678-79.
114. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609,617-29 (1981) (declining to
undertake factual inquiry into the relationship between the benefits provided by the state and
the burdens of a tax in order to provide a mechanism for judicial disapproval of excessive state
taxes under the Commerce Clause).
20031 341
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
whether its regulatory burdens jurisprudence would offer some
protection or insight. Here it faced a problem, at least from the
perspective of the majority. First, it would have had to balance the
state's interests with the burden on the taxpayer. Second, the
finding that a tax compliance system is burdensome would seem
to apply to all taxpayers. State sales and use taxes would have to
be stricken altogether. Burden cases are usually all or nothing
propositions.
How then could the Court accommodate its apparent desire to
protect a taxpayer that has due process connections with a state but
whose economic presence is so small as to make the cost of tax
compliance burdensome? Or, more cynically, how could the Court
find a substantive law justification for allowing the doctrine of stare
decisis to control the outcome of the case? It takes three awkward
(or elegant)15 steps. First, it decouples Commerce Clause nexus
from Due Process nexus. Second, it shoehorns its Commerce Clause
burden concerns into the nexus prong of the Complete Auto test
rather than applying regulatory Commerce Clause precedents.
Third, it pulls the old due process physical presence nexus test out
of the dust heap and gives it Commerce Clause burdens duty.
The problem with this approach is twofold. First, as discussed,
the physical presence test is not an effective tool for sorting out
relative burdens among taxpayers. A large mail-order house could
comply easily, while a small business with a physical presence
might have a much greater burden. The physical presence test is
"artificial through and through."16 It takes legislation to sort out
these distinctions. Second, to add a Commerce Clause burdens
component to the concept of nexus, and to suggest that it has a
meaning different from due process nexus, makes it difficult to
know how to fill Commerce Clause nexus with content. Most of the
nexus "burdens" that come to mind are also due process concerns:
notice, foreseeability, fundamental fairness, and the like.
To its credit, implicit in the Burdens Quill reasoning is that the
nexus rule could be different for a tax that has lower burdens.
Indeed, if a more uniform sales and use tax regime were in place, or
115. "Perspective is everything.' See generally WILL DURANT, THE PLEASURES OF
PHiLOsoPiY (1953).
116. Robert D. Plattner, QuilL- Ten Years After, 25 ST. TAX NOTES 1017, 1020 (2002).
342 [Vol. 45:319
20031 STATE INCOME TAX JURISDICTION
if the specter of thousands of local jurisdictions were removed, then
the Commerce Clause nexus standard would approach the due
process standard, and the physical presence test would not apply
even to sales and use taxes." 7
(3) Disappearing Ink Quill
The Quill Court left open the possibility that it might someday
revisit the Bellas Hess rule. By removing the due process obstacle
to more expansive sales and use tax jurisdiction, Congress has
become "free to decide" the appropriate nexus standard. "8 Thus, the
Court chose to "withhold[] our hand, at least for now."" 9 Indeed,
Quill's holding emphasizes its temporal nature: "[Olur reasoning ...
does not compel that we now reject"20 the Bellas Hess rule, and "we
disagree ... that the time has come to renounce the bright-line test
of Bellas Hess."2'
A twenty-five. year gap spanned the original Bellas Hess decision
and Quill. More than ten years have passed since the Quill decision.
If the rate of change in our society is exponential, then at least
the same amount of change has occurred in the past ten years
as occurred in the twenty-five years prior to Quill.'22 Recent
117. This insight is the major impetus behind the Streamlined Sales Tax Project (SSTP).
This state-initiated project has approved a final draft of a Streamlined Sales and Use Tax
Agreement that is now being presented to state legislatures for approval. The Agreement does
not require that states adopt a uniform tax base, but it does require that the states use
uniform definitions, such as for "food" or "clothing," in defining their taxable base. Further,
the Agreement provides for uniform administrative and procedural rules and calls for the
creation of approved tax reporting software on which taxpayers can fully rely. See generally
Streamlined Sales Tax Project, at httpt/www.streamlinedsalestax.org (last visited Apr. 11,
2003) (official website of the SSTP). The Agreement does not purport to overrule Quill, but
the states hope that Quill will be either judicially or legislatively overruled once the
Agreement is adopted by a sufficient number of states. See Streamlined Sales Tax Project Res.
No. 05-02 (Nov. 13, 2002), at http:J/www.streamlinedsalestax.org/resolutions.html. The
business community has been generally supportive of this effort. See Council on State
Taxation, Report Card on Streamlined Sales Tax Implementing States'Agreement, 26 ST. TAX
NOTES 407 (2002) ("{Tlhe Agreement would represent a major step toward a uniform and
simpler sales and use tax structure.").
118. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 318 (1992).
119. Id. (emphasis added).
120. Id. at 317 (emphasis added).
121. Id. at 317-18 (emphasis added).
122. Assuming the exponent is greater than or equal to two. This is an empirical question.
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developments bear this out. The advent of the Internet12 and e-
commerce since the Quill decision has made geography and physical
presence irrelevant in ways that the Quill Court could not have
contemplated.
In short, the Court may now be ready to revisit and overrule the
Quill decision. Of course, this is speculative. Congressional inaction,
for example, could be taken as acquiescence in, or endorsement of,
the Quill rule. Nevertheless, Quill's apologetic tone, together with
its indication that the Court may revisit the issue in the future,
suggest that the opinion was that could not have been contemplated
by the Quill Court. 24
C. State Income Tax Jurisdiction: Theoretical Underpinnings and
Authorities
Having examined the Court's most recent pronouncement on state
tax nexus, we now turn to an analysis of the principles and cases
directly relevant to state corporate income tax nexus.
1. Theoretical Underpinnings
It is well-settled that state power to tax can arise both from
residence and source. Regarding residence, "[tihat the receipt of
income by a resident of the territory of a taxing sovereignty is a
taxable event is universally recognized. " 25 Regarding source, the
Court "deem[s] it clear, upon principle as well as authority, that just
as a State may impose general income taxes upon its own citizens
and residents ... it may ... levy a duty of like character ... upon
incomes accruing to non-residents from their property or business
within the State."126
123. More specifically, I am referring to the use of the Internet by the general public for
commercial purposes.
124. Also suggesting that the Court may reverse Quill is that the Court felt it appropriate
to clear the way for Congress to act by removing the Due Process Clause barrier to
legislatively overruling the physical presence test. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 318. If the "proper"
policy determination would be to retain the physical presence test, then judicial road clearing
would not have been needed. Congress could have crafted nexus rules under existing
jurisprudence.
125. New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308,312-13 (1932).
126. Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 52 (1920).
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The fundamental rationale for allowing states to tax income with
an in-state source is that the state provides benefits and protections
that allow the income to arise in the first instance."' 7 As stated
expansively by the Court, "[tihe simple but controlling question is
whether the state has given anything for which it can ask return."28
When source and domicile rules conflict, source generally
prevails. Professor Hellerstein observes:
[WIhen both the state of domicile and the state of source have a
legitimate claim to tax income, the state of domicile ordinarily
yields to the state of source to avoid double taxation. This is true
both as a matter of national and international practice, and as
a matter of federal constitutional law.1 9
That income may be sourced to a state-thereby becoming subject
to the state's taxing jurisdiction-does not necessarily mean that the
state has jurisdiction to tax the non-resident who earned the income.
Recall that nexus with income is distinct from nexus with the
taxpayer. 13 If only modern due process standards were implicated,
then jurisdiction over income would usually result in jurisdiction
over the taxpayer. Income in a jurisdiction generally arises only
when a taxpayer has "purposefully availed" him or herself of the
state and has created "minimum contacts."'3 '
Possibly only the odd case of inadvertent income would make the
distinction between nexus with income and nexus with the taxpayer
meaningful. 32 The Quill Court's decoupling of Commerce Clause
and Due Process Clause nexus, however, prevents one from leaping
to this conclusion. The sales and use tax physical presence test gives
rise to numerous instances in which the distinction between nexus
with the taxpayer and nexus with the transaction has tremendous
import, insulating remote sellers from tax collection obligations
despite clear transactional nexus with a state. If the Commerce
127. See generally HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 14, 1 6.04 (recognizing that
the Court has adopted a broad view of source by tying state taxing power to benefits and
protections afforded).
128. Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940).
129. HELLuERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 14, 1 6.03 (citations omitted).
130. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
131. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
132. See HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 14, 6.02(1).
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Clause nexus test for income taxes were also physical presence, the
consequences would be similar.
The severance of Commerce Clause and Due Process Clause
analysis complicates the interpretation of several of the seemingly
relevant income tax cases. The Court decided these cases on due
process grounds alone. Accordingly, one could argue that Quill's
Commerce Clause holding renders these cases irrelevant.
However, grounded as it was in stare decisis, Quill did not raise
the Commerce Clause nexus bar. Instead, Quill lowered the due
process bar to the level that the Court's non-tax due process
jurisprudence had reached long before. Until Quill, the Due Process
and Commerce Clause tax nexus standards were essentially
identical, and many cases treated them as interchangeable, even
failing to precisely identify which standard was being applied." s
Quill simply retained the old Due Process/Commerce Clause
physical presence test for sales and use tax, but removed the due
process label. Thus, pre-Quill Due Process Clause nexus cases are
relevant to post-Quill Commerce Clause nexus analysis.
Of even greater relevance may be the Due Process nexus cases
that pre-date the Court's 1945 landmark opinion in International
Shoe Co. v. Washington."4 In International Shoe, the Court shifted
the focus of judicial jurisdiction away from geographic presence to
a more pragmatic "minimum contacts" analysis. 3 ' Because pre-
International Shoe due process tax nexus cases were decided when
the focus of jurisdictional inquiry was on corporate presence, these
cases would seem to have special relevance to a Commerce Clause
standard that also demands presence for sales and use taxes. For
example, if we find that these early income tax cases are based on
economic substance rather than formal labels despite the
jurisprudential milieu in which they were decided, we would expect
a similar approach today.
133. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. See also HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN,
supra note 14, 1 19.02(3XcXii) (noting that the Court "had never indicated that there was any
distinction in the meaning of the nexus requirement under either clause").
134. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
135. Id. at 316.
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2. The Income Tax Authorities
a. Seated yet Absent: New York ex rel. Whitney v. Graves
In Whitney v. Graves,36 a 1937 decision, the Court held that New
York could tax a non-resident on the gain from the sale of a
membership (or seat) in the New York Stock Exchange without
running afoul of the Due Process Clause. 137 The taxpayer had no
physical presence in the state-membership in the Exchange was
intangible personal property. 138 The Court analyzed the issue in
terms of "business situs." 139 Normally intangibles are treated as
located in the owner's state of residence. However, intangibles can
obtain a business situs in another jurisdiction if the rights
associated with the intangibles are sufficiently localized."4 The
Court found that the "dominant attribute" of the membership-a
right to buy and sell securities on the floor of the NYSE-was
sufficiently localized in the situs of the Exchange to "bring it within
the taxing power of New York." 4 Accordingly, "the Court held that
in laying the tax upon the profits derived by the relator from the
sale of the ... membership the State did not exceed the bounds of its
jurisdiction."'42
Whitney is a clear, early example of the Court upholding an
income tax even though the taxpayer had no physical presence in
the state. Indeed, the Court merely applied a well-settled rule for
establishing the situs of intangibles.' 3 Importantly though, the
Court did not find it necessary to find a separate physical presence
to assert jurisdiction over the taxpayer."
Several objections might be raised to the contention that Whitney
v. Graves is good authority for the absence of a state income tax
136. 299 U.S. 366 (1937).
137. Id. at 374.
138. Id. at 371.
139. Id. at 372.
140. See id.
141. Id. at 374.
142. Id.
143. See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. Stemple, 175 U.S. 309, 322-23 (1899) (upholding a
local property tax on notes and mortgages belonging to a person whose only contact with the
jurisdiction was the presence of those intangibles).
144. See Whitney, 299 U.S. at 372.
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physical presence test. First, the decision has a "quasi in rem"
jurisdiction feel, and the Court later rejected this approach to
jurisdiction in favor of the uniform application of minimum contacts
analysis. 145 However, the close relationship between the intangible
and the cause of action-taxation of the gain from the sale of the
intangible-would be clear grounds for asserting jurisdiction under
the latter standard as well. Second, the precedential value of
Whitney might be limited to cases involving intangibles that acquire
a business situs in the state of source. Even if limited in this way,
however, its reach could be extensive. For example, remote sellers
or lenders might still fall within the Whitney rule to the extent they
can be found to acquire in-state intangible contract rights.
14
Third, membership in the New York Stock Exchange might be
likened to a partnership interest. Thus, the owner of the mem-
bership could be treated as having a physical presence in New York
by attribution of the physical presence of the New York Stock
Exchange to the owner. 4 v Fourth, a narrow, literal reading of the
holding suggests that the Court only addressed jurisdiction over the
income, not the taxpayer.'4" Although it appears that the Court
treated the two as going hand in hand, one must concede that a
more vigorously litigated case might have drawn out this dis-
tinction. Finally, the case was decided on Due Process Clause rather
than Commerce Clause grounds. 4 ' We have already addressed why
this distinction may not be significant, particularly for cases like
Whitney that were decided before International Shoe.5"
In summary, the Court held in Whitney v. Graves that a state has
jurisdiction to impose its income tax despite the absence of taxpayer
145. See Walter Hellerstein, State Taxation of Corporate Income from Intangibles: Allied-
Signal and Beyond, 48 TAx L. REV. 739, 824 n.446 (discussing jurisdictional aspects of taxing
income from intangibles).
146. An example of such in-state intangible contract rights is business receivables.
147. Partners, limited liability company members, and subchapter S corporation
shareholders often are treated as being present and taxable through the in-state presence of
the entity. See Bruce P. Ely, State Taxation of Limited Liability Companies and Limited
Liability Partnerships: Background and Recent Developments, in POMP & OLDMAN, supra note
20, at 10-57, 10-59.
148. See Whitney, 299 U.S. at 374 (holding that the state did not exceed its jurisdiction in
laying tax upon the profits derived from the sale).
149. See id. at 370.
150. See supra Part I.C.1.
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physical presence.' Still, its holding might be limited to income
from certain well-defined intangibles, and its relevance to the
Commerce Clause substantial nexus requirement can be challenged,
however weakly.
b. Taxing Non-Resident Shareholders: International
Harvester Co. v. Wisconsin Department of Taxation
In International Harvester,1 52 a due process challenge, the Court
upheld the constitutionality of a Wisconsin tax on International
Harvester shareholders measured by the Wisconsin portion of
dividend distributions.*3 The Wisconsin portion of the dividends
was measured by using an apportionment formula essentially
identical to the formula used to allocate International Harvester's
income for corporate income tax purposes.' 5 ' Although the tax was
collected through a withholding obligation imposed on the dis-
tributing corporation, the Wisconsin Supreme Court had clarified
that the legal incidence of the tax was on the shareholders. The
Supreme Court's opinion in International Harvester was based
expressly on this determination.155 Indeed, the basis of the plaintiffs'
claim was that the tax violated the due process rights of the
"stockholder-taxpayers. "p56
The Court ruled that "appellants' stockholders can have no
constitutional objection to the withholding by Wisconsin of a tax
measured by their dividends distributed from Wisconsin
earnings." 7 The Court unequivocally found that the shareholders
need not be physically present in the state: "[T]he fact that the
stockholder-taxpayers never enter Wisconsin and are not rep-
resented in the Wisconsin legislature cannot deprive it of its
jurisdiction to tax."' Further,
151. As noted, the case might be distinguished by arguing that the physical presence of the
NYSE was attributable to the seat holder, but the Court did not offer this as a rationale for
its decision. See supra notes 136-42 and accompanying text.
152. Intl Harvester Co. v. Wis. Dep't of Taxation, 322 U.S. 435 (1944).
153. Id. at 445.
154. 1935 Wis. Laws 505 § 3.
155. Intl Harvester, 322 U.S. at 439.
156. Id. at 441.
157. Id. at 445.
158. Id. at 443 (footnote omitted).
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[p] ersonal presence within the state of the stockholder-taxpayers
is not essential to the constitutional levy of a tax taken out of so
much of the corporation's Wisconsin earnings as is distributed
to them. A state may tax such part of the income of a non-
resident as is fairly attributable either to property located in the
state or to events or transactions which, occurring there, are
subject to state regulation and which are within the protection
of the state and entitled to the numerous other benefits which it
confers. 159
This is a ringing endorsement of the theoretical underpinning of tax
jurisdiction over non-residents: source and benefits conferred by the
state.
International Harvester's strength as an authority for state
income tax jurisdiction based on economic presence alone is
weakened by several factors. First, the opinion does not un-
equivocally state that Wisconsin has jurisdiction over the
stockholders and not merely jurisdiction over their income. The
holding of the case specifically referred to the constitutionality of
the withholding of tax by International Harvester, an entity
physically present in the state."6 While the opinion referred to the
tax being imposed against both the shareholders and their income,
the Court was never really compelled to reach the nexus with the
taxpayer question. It noted that withholding is a "practically
effective device ... necessary in order to enable the state to collect its
tax."'61 We cannot be certain, however, whether the withholding tax
is "necessary" only as a "practical[]" administrative matter, or is
"necessary" because of the lack of jurisdiction over the ninety-eight
percent of International Harvester's 32,000 shareholders who
resided outside Wisconsin. 1
6 2
Second, as Justice Jackson's dissent pointed out, the decision may
have been based on a false analogy between corporate income and
dividend distributions to shareholders.' Given this false analogy,
159. Id. at 441-42.
160. See id. at 445 ("no constitutional objection to withholding ... of a tax measured by...
dividends distributed from Wisconsin earnings').
161. Intl Harvester, 322 U.S. at 444.
162. See id.; id. at 446 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
163. See id. at 448 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (stating that dividends are not income of the
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International Harvester looks very much like a pass-through entity
case. For example, states have subjected partners, limited partners,
and S corporation shareholders to the income tax jurisdiction of the
state in which the pass-through entity does business.'" Arguably,
this is consistent with a physical presence test if we treat the pass-
through entity's presence in the taxing jurisdiction as attributable
to the owners.'6
Finally, International Harvester is a due process case, so arguably
it does not speak directly to the Commerce Clause nexus issue.'66
Again, however, pre-Quill and especially pre-International Shoe due
process nexus cases are relevant because the due process tax nexus
standards during those periods reflect the current Commerce Clause
standard." 7
In his analysis of International Harvester, Professor Hellerstein
concludes:
[Tlhere is no denying the fact that the Court's opinion in
International Harvester lends powerful support to those who
argue that a state has constitutional power to impose a tax on a
nonresident based solely on the fact that the source of the
nonresident's income is derived from activities conducted in the
state, regardless of whether the nonresident has any physical
presence in the state.'6
He clarifies, however, that International Harvester may only support
jurisdiction over the income, not the nonresident. 169
corporation "within any legal or accounting definition").
164. See supra note 147 and accompanying text. Otherwise, unless the state imposes an
entity level tax--contrary to the pass-through treatment for federal income tax purposes-the
income escapes taxation in that state.
165. However, if one makes this argument under the International Harvester facts, one
would seem also to accept a theory of shareholder nexus or affiliate nexus (where the
shareholder is a controlling corporation). Taxpayers have opposed these theories of
jurisdiction on the state court level with some success. See generally John A. Swain,
Cybertaxation and the Commerce Clause: Entity Isolation or Affiliate Nexus?, 75 S. CAL. L.
REV. 419 (2002) (arguing that affiliate nexus is a viable theory for asserting jurisdiction over
Internet subsidiaries of physically present brick-and-mortar retailers).
166. See Int'l Harvester, 322 U.S. at 439-40.
167. See supra Part I.C.1.
168. HELLERSTEIN & HELiERSTEIN, supra note 14, 6.04(1).
169. "Needless to say, if the nonresident is not physically present in the state and owns no
property there, it may be difficult to enforce any tax liability that is established on the basis
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c. Provoking Congressional Action: Northwestern States
Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota
Northwestern States involved both Due Process and Commerce
Clause claims. v° The taxpayer was a company incorporated and
headquartered in Iowa.' Though its manufacturing facilities were
located in Iowa, it regularly and systematically solicited orders for
the sale of its product in Minnesota." 2 Forty-eight percent of its
sales were made in Minnesota, and it had a physical presence in
Minnesota consisting of a leased sales office and several sales-
persons.' Minnesota sought to tax its income on an apportioned
basis as determined by a three-factor apportionment formula of
sales, property and payroll.7 4
The primary question before the Court was whether the
Commerce Clause permitted Minnesota to tax income derived from
exclusively interstate activities.7 5 The Court upheld the tax because
it was fairly apportioned, non-discriminatory, imposed no undue
burden, and did not result in multiple taxation.' The Court also
addressed nexus, treating it as a due process concern. It found that
"[i]t strains reality" to say that the taxpayer has no due process
nexus.177
In reaching its decision, the Court examined the decision of the
California Supreme Court in West Publishing Co. v. McColgan.178 In
West Publishing, the Court, per curiam, sustained an income tax
levy where the taxpayer solicited orders for law books published out-
of-state and shipped to customers from out-of-state locations.7 9 The
of source alone." Id. at n.58; see also Hellerstein, supra note 145 (discussing the distinction
between jurisdiction over income and jurisdiction over the taxpayer).
170. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 457, 461-62
(1959).
171. Id. at 453.
172. Id. at 454.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 453-54.
175. Id. at 452.
176. Id. at 461-62.
177. Id. at 464.
178. 166 P.2d 861 (Cal. 1946) (en banc), affd per curiam, 328 U.S. 823 (1946).
179. West Publ'g Co. v. McColgan, 328 U.S. 823 (1946) (per curiam); see West Publ'g, 166
P.3d at 862.
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taxpayer employed four in-state salespersons that used office space
provided by certain attorneys in exchange for making available
some of the legal publications the salespersons kept on hand and
used in connection with soliciting orders."'
Two aspects of the Court's discussion of West Publishing in
Northwestern States are particularly relevant to the issue of income
tax nexus. First, the Court stated that "it is significant ... that West
had not qualified to do business" in the taxing state.18' Second, the
Court approvingly observed that the California Supreme Court's
opinion "was not grounded on the triviality that office space was
given West's solicitors by attorneys.""2 As Professors Rotunda and
Nowak conclude: "On the basis of Northwestern States, it is
reasonably clear that mere solicitation of business by a foreign
corporation in a state ... provides a sufficient nexus to warrant
apportionment of net income to the market state."1s3
Unfortunately, the Court did not tell us if it would adhere to this
conclusion if the taxpayer were not physically present.' Interstate
businesses (and Congress), however, clearly thought that this might
be the natural consequence of the Northwestern States decision.
Soon after the Court released the Northwestern States decision,
Congress enacted P.L. 86-272. P.L. 86-272 created an income tax
nexus safe harbor for sellers of tangible personal property whose
only activity in the state is the solicitation of orders, provided that
the orders are forwarded out-of-state for acceptance and the goods
are shipped from an out-of-state location."s As noted at the outset
of this Article, P.L. 86-272 has stunted the development of a
constitutional income tax nexus standard.186
A separate aspect of Northwestern States is worthy of note.
Justice Frankfurter's dissent demonstrates that the Court
180. West Publ'g, 166 P.2d at 862.
181. Northwestern States, 358 U.S. at 461.
182. Id.
183. RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOwAK, 2 TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 13.4 (3d ed. 1999). Again, however, nexus with the taxpayer
does not necessarily follow from nexus with the income.
184. At least it has not done so in a case decided explicitly under the dormant Commerce
Clause. In both International Harvester and Whitney, the Court did not find that physical
presence was required under the Due Process Clause. See supra Part I.C.2.a-b.
185. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text (discussing the safe harbor provisions
of P.L. 86-272).
186. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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considered, but rejected, compliance burden concerns." 7 Justice
Frankfurter discussed the practical compliance problems for small
interstate businesses at length:
[Tihere are thousands of relatively small or moderate size
corporations doing exclusively interstate business spread over
several States. To subject these corporations to a separate
income tax in each of these States means that they will have to
keep books, make returns, store records, and engage legal
counsel, all to meet the divers and variegated tax laws of forty-
nine States, with their different times for filing returns,
different tax structures, different modes for determining "net
income," and different, often conflicting, formulas of apportion-
ment. This will involve large increases in bookkeeping,
accounting, and legal paraphernalia to meet these new demands.
The cost of such a far-flung scheme for complying with the
taxing requirements of the different States may well exceed the
burden of the taxes themselves, especially in the case of small
companies doing a small volume of business in several States."'
However, he acknowledged:
These considerations do not at all lead to the conclusion that the
vast amount of business carried on throughout all the States as
part of what is exclusively interstate commerce should not be
made to contribute to the cost of maintaining state governments
which, as a practical matter, necessarily contribute to the
conduct of that commerce by the mere fact of their existence as
governments.' 9
Justice Frankfurter concluded that these concerns were best
addressed by Congress."9 Indeed, this is what occurred shortly
thereafter.
Importantly, Justice Frankfurter did not see compliance burdens
as a nexus problem. Similarly, he did not see compliance as a
burden hinging on whether an interstate business is physically
187. See Northwestern States, 358 U.S. at 474 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
188. Id.
189. Id. at 475. Along with compliance burden, he raised a second and related concern
about litigation over the validity of various apportionment formulas. Id.
190. Id. at 476.
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present in the taxing state. Instead, he saw the issue as one for
"small companies doing a small volume of business,"' 9 ' surmising
that the costs of compliance for these companies may exceed the
benefit of revenue raised by the States. Finally, he saw the solution
as legislative.
112
Obviously, the majority was not persuaded that Justice
Frankfurter's concerns have constitutional import, although the
majority did not confront those concerns directly. Justice Harlan's
concurrence addressed the burdens issue, but treated it as solely
one of fairness in apportioning the burden of the tax liability (not
compliance costs). Justice Harlan observed that income taxes
proportionally apply to the profits of local and interstate businesses
alike.19
3
d. The Court's Contemporary Income Tax Cases
After the Court's decision in Northwestern States and the
Congressional response, the corporate income tax spotlight turned
toward formulary apportionment, the unitary business principle,
and combined reporting. Still, elements in these cases and
developments are relevant to the nexus inquiry. First, nearly
contemporaneous with Northwestern States was the adoption by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws of
the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act (UDITPA).'"
As its name suggests, UDITPA contains a uniform set of rules for
the allocation and apportionment of income for state corporate
income tax purposes. Of the states that impose a corporate income
tax, about one-half "have adopted the essential features of UDITPA
and most of the others have statutes that are consistent with
UDITPA's basic approach." 95 Very generally, UDITPA apportions
business income based on the average of three factors: sales,
property, and payroll.' The sales factor, for example, is measured
191. Id. at 474.
192. Id. at 476.
193. See Northwestern States, 358 U.S. at 469 (Harlan, J., concurring).
194. UNW. DIv. OF INCOME FOR TAX PuRPosEs Acr, 7A U.L.A. 141 (2002).
195. POMP & OLDMAN, supra note 20, at 10-1.
196. See i& at 10-11 to 10-12.
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by the ratio of in-state sales to sales everywhere.'97 The property
and payroll factors are computed similarly."'a Although the Court
has allowed states wide latitude in adopting apportionment
formulas, it has recognized UDITPA's three-factor formula as
"something of a benchmark against which other apportionment
formulas are judged."' There is no comparable uniform state sales
and use tax act. °°
A second modem development is that the Court has expressly
allowed states to require multi-corporate enterprises to report on a
combined basis to the extent the combined group is conducting a
unitary business. 2° ' One consequence of combined reporting is that
a member of a combined group that has no in-state physical
presence nonetheless has its income included in the "apportionment
base'"-the amount of taxable income of the combined group to
which the apportionment formula is applied.2° Moreover, if this
non-physically present member has in-state sales, then its sales
may be required to be included in the numerator of the sales
factor. 2°' As a result, combined reporting and formulary
apportionment-both constitutionally blessed by the Court in the
face of Commerce Clause challenges-can have the practical effect
of taxing the income of a non-physically present corporation.
Although the Court has not had occasion to go so far as to hold that
a state has jurisdiction over the taxpayer as well as the income in
these situations, M the gap between nexus with the income and
nexus with the taxpayer has narrowed significantly. 2 5
197. See id at 10-10 to 10-11.
198. See id.
199. Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 170 (1983).
200. But see supra note 117 and accompanying text (noting that the Streamlined Sales Tax
Agreement, though in its infancy, is a significant step toward the creation of a uniform sales
and use tax act).
201. See Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 168; see also infra notes 352-53 and accompanying
text (giving an explanation of the unitary business principle).
202. See Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 304-07 (1994) (noting income
of more than 220 affiliate corporations apportioned to California even though only two
affiliates had California operations).
203. See generally POMP & OLDMAN, supra note 20, at 10-31 (discussing "pure" versus
"nexus" combined reporting).
204. See Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 311-12, 311 n.10 (holding the taxable income of far
flung combined group created a tax liability for only the two in-state affiliates, therefore nexus
defense did not lie).
205. A fair reading of the Court's most recent corporate income tax cases is that nexus with
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Third, the post-Quill case of Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax
Board raised the issue of compliance burdens.2" In Barclays Bank,
the taxpayer claimed, among other things, that California's world-
wide combined reporting scheme violated the anti-discrimination
prong of the Complete Auto test.2 7 Barclays argued that a foreign
taxpayer filing a California tax return is "'forced to convert its
diverse financial and accounting records from around the world into
the language, currency, and accounting principles of the United
States' at 'prohibitiv[e]' expense."0" Barclays estimated, and the
trial court found, that the start-up cost of creating the necessary
accounting system would be more than five million dollars, and that
it would cost more than two million dollars annually to maintain.2"
However, the California Court of Appeals found that Barclays'
actual compliance cost ranged from $900 to $1,250 for one of its two
combined groups.210
The Court acknowledged that a compliance burdens claim could
lie, citing a regulatory burdens case in which the Court applied
its standard balancing test-weighing the burden on interstate
commerce against the benefit to the state.1 The Court, however,
rejected Barclays' claim, noting that "reasonable approximations"
allowed under the California regulations prevent the sort of burden
of which Barclays complained.212
The significance of Barclays Bank for Commerce Clause nexus
analysis is twofold. First, a post-Quill Court seemed to know where
burdens analysis belonged. 213 Second, the Court held that a complex
the taxpayer and nexus with the income remain separate, though obviously related inquiries.
See, e.g., Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 504 U.S. 768, 778 (1992) ("[Tihere
must be a connection to the activity itself, rather than a connection only to the actor the State
seeks to tax .... ); see also supra note 183 and accompanying text.
206. 512 U.S. 298 (1994).
207. See id. at 312-13. Presumably, a nexus argument was not available to Barclays
because two of its affiliates were physically present and doing business in California. See id.
at 311 n.10.
208. Id. at 313 (alteration in original).
209. Id. at 313 n.11.
210. Id. at 314 n.13.
211. Id. at 313 (citing Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333,350-
51 (1977)). In Hunt, the Court held that the increased costs imposed by a North Carolina
statute on out-of-state producers "would tend to shield the local apple industry from the
competition of Washington apple growers." Hunt, 432 U.S. at 351.
212. Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 314.
213. The Court recognized that the burdens analysis belonged under the discriminatory
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worldwide combined corporate income tax reporting obligation was
not burdensome. Of course, a nexus challenge was not available to
Barclays,214 and it is not suggested that Quill would be overruled
simply because a later Court examined compliance burdens under
another prong of the Complete Auto test. Nonetheless, Barclays
Bank may demonstrate an increasing sophistication of the Court in
dealing with claims of undue tax compliance burden. Indeed, it
might suggest how the Court would rule with respect to corporate
income tax nexus when the Court is unencumbered by naked stare
decisis concerns.
e. Post-Quill State Court Decisions: A Divergence of Opinions
Soon after Quill was decided, the South Carolina Supreme Court
held that Quill's physical presence test was inapplicable to income
tax.21 In Geoffrey, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Commission, Toys R
Us had transferred its trademarks and related intangibles to
Geoffrey, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary corporation located in
Delaware.216 Toys R Us then paid Geoffrey a royalty for the use of
these trademarks in South Carolina." 7 This had the effect of
reducing the taxable income of Toys R Us in South Carolina, while
Geoffrey's corresponding income went untaxed in Delaware.21 In
auditing Toys R Us, South Carolina initially tried to disallow the
deduction for the royalty to Geoffrey, claiming that it was an
arbitrary shift of income and expenses between Geoffrey and Toys
R Us.2 9 The state subsequently abandoned this position and took
the straightforward approach of assessing Geoffrey on the royalty
income attributable to the use of its trademarks and related
intangibles in South Carolina. 20 Along with a due process claim,
Geoffrey argued that it had no physical presence in South Carolina
burden prong of the Complete Auto test, rather than under the nexus prong,
214. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
215. Geoffrey, Inc. v. S.C. Tax Comm'n, 437 S.E.2d 13 (S.C. 1993).
216. Id. at 15.
217. See id.
218. See id. Delaware, a well-known corporate haven, exempts from income taxation a
corporation whose in-state activities are limited to the maintenance and management of its
intangible assets. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 1902(bX8) (1974 & Supp. 2002).
219. Geoffrey, Inc., 437 S.E.2d at 15.
220. Id.
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and was therefore protected from taxation by the dormant
Commerce Clause and the Quill physical presence test.221
The South Carolina Supreme Court rejected both of Geoffrey's
constitutional defenses. Due process was not offended because
Geoffrey had purposefully directed its economic activities toward
the state and had benefitted from government protections.222
Additionally, its intangibles were "present" in the state.2
Regarding the dormant Commerce Clause, the court found that
Quill's physical presence test was limited to sales and use taxes.224
Moreover, it found ample Commerce Clause nexus based on the
presence of Geoffrey's intangible property in the state and on the
provision of state-provided protections and benefits-essentially the
same reasons the court gave in rejecting Geoffrey's due process
challenge.225
Some commentators bitterly attacked Geoffrey as a renegade
decision,226 and most others were disappointed by the perfunctory
treatment that the court gave to Quill-dismissing its relevance in
a footnote.227 Nevertheless, a number of state courts have agreed
with Geoffrey.228 In what initially was seen as a taxpayer victory, the
221. Id. at 16.
222. Id. at 16-17.
223. Id. at 17.
224. Id. at 18 n.4.
225. Id. at 18 & n.5 (citing Int'l Harvester Co. v. Wis. Dep't of Taxation, 322 U.S. 435, 441-
42 (1944)).
226. See David Cowling, Nexus From Intangibles--Geoffrey, 10 ST. TAX NOTES 129, 131 &
n.16 (1996) (citing highly critical commentary of Geoffrey that describes the decision as
"intellectually dishonest").
227. See, e.g., HELLEESTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 14, 1 6.11(2) (criticizing the court
for its perfunctory treatment of some of the issues and its failure to address others, though
this "does not necessarily mean that Geoffrey was wrongly decided"); POMP & OLDMAN, supra
note 20, at 11-127 to 11-128 (criticizing Geoffrey as lacking "intellectual rigor" and noting the
divergence of subsequent state court opinions). But see Michael T. Fatale, Geoffrey Sidesteps
QuilL" Constitutional Nexus, Intangible Property and the State Taxation of Income, 23
HoFsTRA L. REv. 407, 411 (1994) (supporting cogently the Geoffivy decision).
228. See Borden Chems. & Plastics, L.P. v. Zehnder, 726 N.E.2d 73,80 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000)
(physical presence not applicable to income taxes); Truck Renting & Leasing Ass'n, Inc. v.
Comm'r of Revenue, 746 N.E.2d 143, 149 n.13 (Mass. 2001) (citing Geoffrey and noting that
neither party claimed that a physical presence test was applicable to the Massachusetts
corporate excise tax); Mayer & Schweitzer, Inc. v. Div. of Taxation, 20 N.J. Tax 217,231 (N.J.
Tax. Ct. 2002) (implying that the physical presence test is not applicable to state income
taxes); KMart Props., Inc. v. Taxation and Revenue Dep't, No. 21,140 (N.M. Ct. App. Nov. 27,
2001) (holding that the physical presence test is not applicable to income taxes), available at
LEXIS 2001 STT 233-18, cert. granted, 40 P.3d 1008 (N.M. 2002); Couchot v. State Lottery
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Tennessee Court of Appeals in J.C. Penney National Bank v.
Johnson229 invalidated a franchise and excise tax assessment
against a credit card company that did not have a physical presence
in the state."' While being careful not to decide whether a physical
presence was required, the court noted that the Commissioner of
Revenue cited no authority in which the United States Supreme
Court had "upheld a state tax where the out-of-state taxpayer had
absolutely no physical presence.""' The court then expressed
concern that "we would be unjustifiably overlapping the [Due
Process and Commerce] clauses" if the court were to uphold the tax
assessment." 2 The court acknowledged that the Quill Court had
expressed "some reservations about the vitality of the Bellas Hess
decision,"233 but it believed that it was not in a position to speculate
as to how the Supreme Court might decide future cases.2"" A few
state tax courts have extended Quill's physical presence test to
other taxes.23
A careful reading of J.C. Penney reveals that while the court was
reluctant to find that physical presence is required for franchise tax
nexus, it believed that the taxing authority was asking it to merge
the Due Process and Commerce Clause tests under Quill."6 The
court seemed to say that Quill's substantial nexus analysis was
applicable to the instant case, and that the taxing authority had
offered no separate Commerce Clause substantial nexus analysis as
Comm'n, 659 N.E.2d 1225, 1230-31 (Ohio 1996) (upholding income taxation of out-of-state
winner of Ohio lottery); Gen. Motors Corp. v. City of Seattle, 25 P.3d 1022, 1029 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2001) (declining to extend physical presence requirement to gross receipts tax).
229. 19 S.W.3d 831 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).
230. Id. at 842.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 839.
234. Id.
235. See, e.g., Rylander v. Bandag Licensing Corp., 18 S.W.3d 296, 300 (Tex. App. 2000)
(finding "no principled distinction" between franchise and sales/use taxes for the purposes of
Commerce Clause nexus); Cerro Copper Prods., Inc. v. Ala. Dep't of Revenue, No. F.94-444,
1995 Ala. Tax LEXIS 211, at *6 (Admin. Law Div. Dec. 11, 1995) (holding that the test applies
to franchise tax). Cf SYL, Inc. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, No. C-96-0154-01, 1999 WL
322666, at *5 (Md. Tax Ct. 1999) (declining to extend Quill beyond sales and use taxes absent
"explicit direction," but nevertheless holding that an out-of-state intangibles holding company
that licensed intellectual property to an in-state affiliate did not have a "substantial nexus"
with the state).
236. J.C. Penney, 19 S.W.3d at 842.
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a substitute for the sales and use tax physical presence test.23 7
In the court's view, substantial nexus was due process minimum
contacts "plus something,"238 and the only "plus something" offered
to the court was physical presence.
This cautious view of J.C. Penney was confirmed in America
Online, Inc. v. Johnson,239 in which the Tennessee Court of Appeals
reversed a summary judgment in favor of the taxpayer, America
Online, and remanded the case for further discovery regarding the
taxpayer's contacts with the state.2 ° In reaching its decision, the
court cautioned that J.C. Penney did not"simply substitute 'physical
presence' for 'nexus."241 It reemphasized: "What we actually said in
J.C. Penney was, 'It is not our purpose to decide whether 'physical
presence' is required under the Commerce Clause."242 Nevertheless,
elsewhere in America Online the court drew a line between
businesses whose only contacts with a state are by "Internet, mail,
and common carriers" and those whose contacts include relation-
ships with in-state businesses and persons who facilitate their
exploitation of the local market.243 Proponents of an economic nexus
standard for state income taxes would not make this distinction.2"
In summary, post-Quill state court income tax nexus decisions do
more to illustrate the uncertainty and divergence of opinion
regarding the appropriate test than to add clarity. Though the
greater weight of authority supports an economic nexus standard,
237. Id. at 839 (emphasis added).
238. Richard L. Lieberman & Stewart Lipeles, The Geoffrey Case: A Failed Attempt to
Provide Content to the Economic Nexus Principle, 6 ST. TAXNOTES 697,708 (1994) (using "plus
something" metaphor to distinguish the Commerce Clause nexus standard from the Due
Process Clause standard). This metaphor is not entirely apt. Although the Commerce Clause
standard may exceed the Due Process Clause standard, it need not. See Quill Corp. v. North
Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 313 n.7 (1992) (explaining that being consistent with due process does
not always mean that a tax will pass Commerce Clause analysis). In other words, minimum
contacts, and no more, may be sufficient under the Commerce Clause, depending on whether
the tax under scrutiny imposes constitutionally significant burdens on interstate commerce.
See infra Part II.C (reconciling meaning of the differently worded tests).
239. No. M2001-00927-COA-R3-CV, 2002 WL 1751434 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 30, 2002).
240. Id. at *4.
241. Id. at *2.
242. Id.
243. Id. at *3.
244. Income that can be sourced to the market state, at least above a de minimis threshold,
would create sufficient nexus under this view. See infra notes 385-87 and accompanying text
(discussing economic nexus proposals).
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the applicability of Quill to income tax nexus is still vigorously
litigated. Undoubtedly, most non-physically present taxpayers still
take the reporting position that they are not subject to tax, and
taxing authorities have been generally timid in testing the limits of
Quill in the income tax context.245
II. DETERMINING THE STATE CORPORATE INCOME TAX
JURISDICTIONAL STANDARD
The authorities discussed in Part I can now be applied to the
questions of whether state corporate income tax nexus demands a
taxpayer's physical presence, and, if not, what are the nexus
requirements?
A. The Income Tax Authorities
International Harvester and Whitney lend strong support to the
proposition that taxpayer physical presence is not required for state
income tax jurisdiction. International Harvester says as much,2"
and the facts of Whitney make clear that lack of physical presence
was no barrier to jurisdiction.2 47 The Court's dictum in International
Harvester is emphatic on this point.2 The Court's expansive view
of income tax jurisdiction, at a time when "presence" was the
touchstone of jurisdictional analysis, buttresses this conclusion.
Further, the doctrinal milieu in which the Court decided these cases
blunts the objection that they are "merely" due process cases. If
today's Commerce Clause nexus standard is today's due process
standard "plus something,"249 the due process standard at the time
of International Harvester and Whitney was today's due process
standard "plus something" as well.
This is not to say that International Harvester and Whitney are
unequivocally controlling. There are lingering doubts about whether
245. Cf Cowling, supra note 226, at 141 (advising that some taxing authorities are
approaching the Geoffrey decision with caution, and that although risks may be involved,
taxpayers should not necessarily change their reporting positions in light of this single state
court opinion).
246. See supra notes 158-59 and accompanying text.
247. See supra Part I.C.2.a.
248. See Int'l Harvester Co. v. Wis. Dep't of Taxation, 322 U.S. 435, 441-42 (1943).
249. See supra note 238 (explaining limits of the "plus something" metaphor).
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they address nexus with income or nexus with the out-of-state
taxpayer. They also might be considered crude pass-through
entity cases, implicitly grounded on the attribution of the phys-
ical presence of an in-state entity (the NYSE in one case and
International Harvester in the other). Furthermore, even if
controlling, Whitney might be limited to cases involving the in-state
business situs of a well-defined intangible.25
Regardless of whether one views International Harvester and
Whitney as directly controlling, one can draw two powerful and
unequivocal conclusions. First, whatever these cases might have
done, they, nor any other pre-Quill Supreme Court income tax
decision, did not establish a physical presence test for state income
taxation. Nor did any other pre-Quill Supreme Court income tax
decision. There is no "Bellas Hess" of corporate income tax
jurisdiction. Accordingly, to the extent Quill is grounded in stare
decisis and concerns about reliance interests, it has little application
to state income tax jurisdiction.
Second, the Court in International Harvester and Whitney
strongly adhered to the principle of source taxation, and, more
generally, to acknowledging the primacy of economic substance in
income tax matters. This adherence contrasted with the formalism
that permeates the Court's sales and use tax decisions, including
Quill with its bright-line test. For example, International Harvester
was decided fourteen days after the Court had decided that, on the
one hand, a state could not impose a sales tax on certain sales by an
out-of-state seller that had physical contacts with the state, but, on
the other hand, a state could assess a use tax collection obligation on
a similarly situated out-of-state seller."51 In a well-known concurring
opinion, Justice Rutledge criticized the formalistic approach of
the majority in these cases." 2 To support his argument, Justice
250. See supra Part I.C.2.a (discussing Whitney v. Graves).
251. Compare McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944) (holding that the state
court does not have jurisdiction to impose sales tax), with Gen. Trading Co. v. State Tax
Comm'n, 322 U.S. 335 (1944) (holding that the state court does have jurisdiction to impose use
tax collection obligation).
252. Intl Harvester, 322 U.S. at 352 (Rutledge, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). The Rutledge concurrence is treated as a separate "case" in both of the leading state
and local tax casebooks. See JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND
LOcAL TAXATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 804 (7th ed. 2001); POMP & OLDMIAN, supra note 20,
at 9-27. Rutledge articulated, among other things, the practical rationale for taxing sales in
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Rutledge cited the majority opinion in Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney,"3
an earlier case upholding the same tax that was upheld in
International Harvester, for the proposition that the validity of a
state tax should not "turn on" formal labels. 24 The point here is that
the Court's income tax decisions have recognized economic sub-
stance in a way that its sales and use tax cases have not.
Northwestern States represents the last step in a thwarted
journey that might have tested fully the limits of state income tax
jurisdiction under the Commerce Clause. Because the taxpayer in
that case was physically present, it does not tell us with certainty
how far the Court will go. What is certain, however, is that the
"triviality" of physical presence was not treated as a touchstone in
reaching the conclusion that mere solicitation of business was a
sufficient predicate for a state to assert its income tax.25 Obviously,
Northwestern States vestablished neither a physical presence test
nor a reliance interest therein.2' To the contrary, it prompted
Congressional action in response to taxpayer insecurities about the
possible reach of the decision.25 7 Finally, Northwestern States also
is a case in which a tax compliance burden argument, very similar
to that raised in Bellas Hess and Quill, was implicitly rejected.2 8
The Court's unitary business and combined reporting cases are
not dispositive of the nexus issue. They focused instead on the fair
apportionment prong of the Complete Auto test. These cases
nevertheless have blessed UDIPTA's three-factor apportionment as
"something of a benchmark," implying that a state may properly
source income based on in-state sales alone. 9 To be sure, income
nexus and taxpayer nexus remain separate inquiries, but the close
connection between the two is evident from the Court's decisions.
On a more general level, the unitary business/combined reporting
the destination state while allowing a credit for taxes paid to the state of origin. See Int'l
Harvester, 322 U.S. at 359-61. Rutledge explained that other alternatives, such as
apportioning the tax, would be impractical. Id.
253. 311 U.S. 435 (1940).
254. Int'l Harvester, 322 U.S. at 352.
255. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
256. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
257. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
258. See supra Part I.C.2.c. Northwestern States, however, is not conclusive on this point
because the court rejected the compliance burdens argument in the context of a case involving
a physically present taxpayer.
259. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
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cases reflect a recognition by the Court of the need to focus on
economic substance in the income tax area. The Court also has
demonstrated in these cases an appreciation of the complexity
inherent in maintaining fidelity to economic realities. In recognizing
the complexity, the Court has not been dissuaded from upholding
economically sound tax reporting principles in the face of alleged
undue burdens.2"
B. Income Tax Nexus and the Three Faces of Quill
As noted in Part I, the Commerce Clause portion of the Quill
decision has stare decisis, undue burdens, and disappearing ink
faces.2"1 Quill's relevance to income tax nexus depends largely on
which face predominates. This Article will discuss each approach
separately, and then will draw the approaches together in a con-
cluding section.
1. Stare Decisis Quill
For many observers, Quill is about naked stare decisis: reliance
interests in an outdated but still workable rule. Implicit in this view
is that if Quill had been a case of first impression, then the physical
presence test would not have been established. The state of the law
and the modern economy when Quill was decided would not have
countenanced it.
Under this view of Quill, there is no physical presence test for
corporate income taxes because there was no bright-line income tax
nexus test at the time Quill was decided. Further, and for this same
reason, there is no reliance interest in a bright-line physical
presence test for corporate income taxes. If there is no rule, there
can be no reliance on it. The absence of a pre-existing physical
presence test became abundantly clear after Quill, when several
state courts ruled that Quill did not apply to income taxes, and
commentators agreed that Quill left the income tax nexus question
unresolved.26 2 In fact, a primary argument in support of the
260. See supra Part I.C.2.d.
261. See supra Part I.B.2.c.
262. See supra Part I.C.2.e.
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petitions for certiorari in the Geoffrey and J.C. Penney National
Bank cases was that Quill left unresolved the nexus standard for
state franchise and income taxes." Put differently, there is no
antecedent "Bellas Hess" of income tax jurisdiction unless it is
International Harvester or Whitney, both of which reject a physical
presence requirement.2 Stare Decisis Quill required following the
Court's decision in Bellas Hess. Otherwise, the outcome would have
been different.
Stare Decisis Quill also concerned itself with the retroactive
application of a use tax collection obligation. This consequence of
reversing a settled rule clearly troubled the Court.2" Assuming,
arguendo, the validity of this concern, use tax collection is different
from income tax reporting. Use tax collectors have the opportunity
to pass on the tax in the first instance by collecting it from
customers. The retroactive application of a use tax collection
obligation generally denies use tax collectors this opportunity. The
result can be harsh. For this reason, the rule of thumb for use tax
collectors is "when in doubt, collect the tax."
Income tax liabilities are different. Income tax collectors have no
opportunity to pass the tax on to the consumer in the first
instance.2 Accordingly, income taxpayers are more likely to avoid
paying tax when there is only a good faith or substantial basis for
the position taken-why pay now when the worst case scenario is to
pay later, albeit with interest?26 Moreover, if a state determined
that a multistate taxpayer had nexus with it and the taxpayer had
not reported income, the taxpayer ordinarily would have the
opportunity to amend the returns that had erroneously reported the
income to other jurisdictions. Theoretically, expanding nexus does
not necessarily result in increased income tax liability, either
prospectively or retroactively. This is admittedly a gross overs-
implification.2" Nevertheless, income taxpayers probably would be
harmed less by "retroactive" application of an economic nexus rule
263. See supra text accompanying notes 16-20.
264. See supra Part I.C.2.a-b.
265. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
266. Of course, part of the income tax burden may be passed on as an economic, as opposed
to a contractual matter.
267. A penalty risk also exists, depending on the statutory penalty standard.
268. See infra notes 300-03 and accompanying text (discussing the conditions for an income
tax system that would apportion precisely 100% of taxpayer income among the states).
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than would be use tax collectors. Moreover, legal theories are
available that allow taxpayers to avoid or cushion the retroactive
application of a new rule.269
In summary, income tax nexus is, at best, a case of first impres-
sion. Since Quill was decided, the law, buttressed by technological
and economic developments, has trended further away from the
notion that physical presence is a necessary condition to the
assertion of jurisdiction. If Quill has nothing more to show us than
its stare decisis face, then physical presence is not required for
income tax nexus.
2. Burdens Quill
Of course, the Quill Court does offer a substantive legal
justification for maintaining the physical presence test. ° Although
businesses that exploit a state's market without having a physical
presence have no due process objection to taxation, taxation of such
entities is an undue burden on interstate commerce.2 ' The rationale
is twofold: First, asking these businesses to comply with the non-
uniform sales and use tax rules of over 6,000 state and local
jurisdictions is unduly burdensome. Second, a bright-line physical
presence test relieves the burden caused by the uncertainty of
determining when one has sufficient tax nexus.272
Burdens Quill focuses on a particular type of compliance burden:
the burden caused by numerous jurisdictions adopting non-uniform
tax rules and procedures. Implicit in this rationale is that the
burden on commerce decreases as uniformity increases and the
number of jurisdictions decreases. Indeed, if there were only fifty
taxing jurisdictions and one set of sales and use tax rules, then the
269. See infra notes 305-06 and accompanying text. The argument here is that a decision
upholding economic income tax nexus would not constitute a change in the law. It is not
beyond the realm of possibility, however, that the Court would adopt a prospective-only
remedy as a means of reaching a just result. See James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501
U.S. 529, 546 (1991) (White, J., concurring) (noting that no one can "sensibly insist on
automatic retroactivity for any and all judicial decisions in the federal system"); supra note
99.
270. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
271. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
272. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
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unconstitutional burden identified in Quill undoubtedly would be
relieved.
Because the compliance burden can vary from tax to tax,
comparing sales and use tax compliance burdens with state income
tax compliance burdens is important under Burdens Quill. This is
an empirical question. This Article does not claim to report the
results of an empirical study. Interested states and taxpayers are
encouraged to conduct such a study, which is highly relevant if one
takes Burdens Quill seriously. Nevertheless, several key features of
state corporate income taxes suggest that they are significantly less
burdensome in the ways that concerned Burdens Quill: First, most
state corporate income taxes use federal income tax measures of net
income as a starting point in calculating taxable income.273 States
have no corresponding pre-determined starting point for sales and
use tax calculations. Second, unlike sales and use taxes, most state
corporate income taxes use UDITPA, or formulas based on UDITPA,
to allocate and apportion income.27" ' States have no analogous
uniform state sales and use tax act.275 Third, significantly fewer
jurisdictions impose a net income tax than impose a sales and use
tax. 276 Fourth, income tax returns typically are filed annually while
sales and use tax returns are filed monthly.277 Fifth, income tax
returns are prepared based on financial and tax accounting records
and do not involve the collection and payment of a tax on each retail
purchase or sale transaction. Thus, the infrastructure and data
collecting costs for sales and use taxes may be greater. Sixth, in the
sales and use tax context, remote sellers often complain that their
273. According to one treatise:
The outstanding characteristic of state corporate net income taxes is their broad
conformity to the federal corporate income tax....
Pressure from taxpayers for easing compliance and auditing burdens has been
the prime force responsible for the very wide conformity of the state corporate
income tax base to the federal corporate income tax base....
HELLEESTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 14, 1 7.02.
274. Supra notes 195-99 and accompanying text.
275. But see supra note 117 (discussing the ongoing State Streamlined Sales Tax Project).
276. Most state income taxes are imposed only at the state level. Cf HELLERSTEIN &
HELLERSTEIN, supra note 14, 16.11(1) (explaining that South Carolina wished to tax income
on South Carolina sales in Geoffrey).
277. Compare ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-5014(A) (West Supp. 2002) (requiring monthly
sales tax returns), with ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-501 (West Supp. 2002) (requiring annual
income tax returns due).
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customers are more likely to refuse to pay tax than are customers
in face-to-face retail transactions."' This is not an issue for income
taxpayers because the income tax is not a tax collected from
customers.279 Seventh, typically, income taxpayers are not required
to obtain separate tax licenses for each jurisdiction in which they do
business, as is often the case for sales and use taxpayers."o Again,
the burdens question is largely empirical.2"'
There are indications that the Court indeed may view income tax
compliance burdens differently from sales and use tax burdens.
For example, the Court in both Barclays and Northwestern States
failed to find that income tax compliance burdens were unduly
burdensome.8 2 However, these cases do not yield a conclusive indi-
cation of what the Court would find absent such presence because
both cases involved a physically present taxpayer.
The second burdens consideration is the value of a bright-line
test. The bright-line test does both stare decisis and compliance
burdens duty-under the former because of the reliance interest in
the existing rule, and under the latter as a tool to define a class of
burdened taxpayers. Stare decisis and compliance burdens caused
by non-uniform rules and multiple jurisdictions have already been
addressed.2' The Court goes further, however, and claims that a
bright-line test has intrinsic value because it reduces taxpayer
uncertainty about the reach of a state's taxing authority.2 '
Accordingly, the absence of a bright-line test may arguably increase
income tax compliance uncertainty (i.e., burden), and so adoption of
the physical presence test is warranted.
278. See Eugene F. Corrigan, Searching for the Truth, 26 ST. TAX NOTES 677, 677-78
(discussing the difficulty of collecting sales tax from remote customers). This was probably
more of a problem when true mail-order sales were more common. Modern buyers placing
orders by credit card over the phone or on the Internet have less opportunity to rebel.
279. Of course, customers may bear partially the economic burden of the tax.
280. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-5005 (West 1999 & Supp. 2002) (requiring persons
conducting business in two or more locations to procure a separate license for each location).
281. In doing a comparative compliance burdens study it would be important to isolate
those burdens of Commerce Clause concern: e.g., burdens caused by lack of uniformity among
the various jurisdictions, by the number of jurisdictions nationwide that impose separate
income taxes, and by the number of returns required to be filed, rather than simply lump all
tax compliance burdens together.
282. See supra notes 176, 212 and accompanying text
283. See supra Part I.B.2.c.(2).
284. Quill, 504 U.S. at 315; see also supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
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There are two basic responses to this argument. First, the Court
does not treat a bright-line test as a necessary condition for
relieving undue Commerce Clause burdens. Indeed, the Court
reminds us that modern jurisprudence has moved away from such
tests.' Second, there are other "bright-line" tests that suggest
themselves in the context of state corporate income taxes. Most
obvious is the three-factor UDITPA apportionment formula.' If, by
application of these factors, we can identify income that has nexus
with a jurisdiction, then it is a small step to find Commerce Clause
nexus with the income-producing taxpayer, provided that the
taxpayer also has due process nexus. 7 One of the attractions of this
bright-line test is that a sizeable body of case law has evolved
around these apportionment principles,' and the Court recognizes
the three-factor formula as "something of a benchmark." 9
Often it is naive to think that a so-called bright-line will eliminate
gray areas and the litigation that results. Lawyers and law students
understand that it is often the courts that resolve the inevitable
gray area questions by building a body of case law. If one is looking
for a bright-line for state income tax nexus, the well-worn path of
apportionment factors may be more brightly illuminated than a
physical presence test.' Indeed, when tax advisors are asked to
give state income tax nexus opinions they typically fall back on the
UDITPA factors as a safe harbor.29'
In sum, income tax compliance burdens may not be undue, and to
the extent that the Quill Court endorses the value of a bright-line
rule, it does not necessarily follow that the bright-line for corporate
income tax nexus should be physical presence.
285. Quill, 504 U.S. at 314 ("[Olur Commerce Clause jurisprudence now favors more
flexible balancing analyses."). See id. at 305-08.
286. See supra notes 196-99 and accompanying text.
287. See infra note 338 and accompanying text (discussing proposal to equate income tax
nexus with existence of an apportionment factor of greater than zero).
288. Seegenerally HELtmlrEIN&HELRSTEIN, supra note 14, 1 9.18 (discussing UDITPA
sales factor and associated case law).
289. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
290. See infra notes 385-87 and accompanying text (discussing the Multistate Tax
Commission's factor nexus proposal).
291. This statement is based on the author's own experience as a tax attorney as well as
off-the-record conversations with other tax attorneys specializing in-state and local taxation.
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3. Disappearing Ink Quill
Eventual abandonment of the physical presence test is implicit in
Disappearing Ink Quill. Under this view, the Court will re-examine
Commerce Clause nexus as a matter of first impression. The
apologetic tone of Quill signals the probable result under this
scenario: a decision acknowledging that economic exploitation of a
state's marketplace is ample grounds for imposing a tax.
4. Integrating the Faces of Quill
The relevant income tax authorities, along with a synthesis of the
three faces of Quill, strongly suggest that physical presence is not
required for corporate income tax nexus. The income tax cases that
preceded Quill did not establish a physical presence test, and so the
stare decisis rationale of Quill has no application.292 Further, Quill
itself did not establish an income tax nexus rule.
Without a stare decisis backdrop, Burdens Quill loses much of its
authority. The Quill Court made it clear that the case may have
been decided differently had it been one of first impression."3 Thus,
Burdens Quill is a second-best solution, doing rear guard duty to
protect an antiquated bright-line test and the reliance interests of
the mail-order industry. While we cannot quarrel with the Burdens
Quill observation that the Due Process and Commerce Clauses are
animated by differing constitutional considerations,2 the Court
turns to the physical presence test largely because of stare decisis
considerations.
Even if we take Burdens Quill at face value, Burdens Quill
implies that the substantial nexus required will vary depending on
the burden imposed by the lack of uniformity among state tax rules
and, more importantly, by the sheer number of jurisdictions
imposing the tax at issue." There are strong reasons to believe that
292. See supra Part IA.
293. Quill, 504 U.S. at 311.
294. Id. at 312.
295. Both the Bellas Hess and Quill Courts seem to be particularly troubled by the number
of jurisdictions to which a remote taxpayer might have to report. See HELLERSTEIN &
HELLERSMIN, supra note 252, at 274 (emphasizing that the burdens' bugaboo is the number
of jurisdictions implicated).
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state corporate income taxes are less burdensome than sales and
use taxes on both counts.2"
Finally, Disappearing Ink Quill is not a remote possibility,
although the analysis in this Article is not predicated on that view
of Quill. The jurisprudential "megatrend" is away from bright-line
jurisdiction tests.297 Quill is now more than ten years old.
Accordingly, the Court quite possibly could reverse Quill. If we
combine the Disappearing Ink qualities of Quill with the absence of
stare decisis considerations for income tax nexus, there is an even
greater likelihood that the Quill physical presence test will not be
adopted for corporate income tax nexus purposes.
C. Substantial Nexus and Minimum Contacts: Giving Content to a
Corporate Income Nexus Standard
The central conclusion of this Article is that physical presence is
not an income tax nexus requirement. Accordingly, substantial
nexus for income taxes may approach the due process minimum
contacts standard. This is not inconsistent with Quill. Quill does not
hold that the Commerce Clause threshold is higher or lower than
the due process threshold. It says that the thresholds are different.
They are different because they reflect different values and
concerns.29 Due process concerns itself with "notice" and "fair
warning" while the Commerce Clause concerns itself with burdens
on interstate commerce.'" The labels placed on these distinct
tests-"minimum contacts" and "substantial nexus"--do not so
much have intrinsic meaning to be divined, say, from an inquiry
into the meaning of "substantial," as they are shorthand for the
values that underlie the constitutional provisions which they mark.
Thus, even under the strongest view of Quill-Burdens Quill-the
income tax nexus test will approach the "minimum contacts" test to
the extent state income tax compliance burdens are less than
comparable sales and use tax burdens.'
296. See supra notes 273-81 and accompanying text.
297. EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFUCT OF LAWS 291 (3d ed. 2000).
298. Quill, 504 U.S. at 312.
299. See id.
300. While it has been suggested that substantial nexus is minimum contacts "plus
something," a more precise statement is that of the Quill Court: "[A) corporation may have
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I will make two final observations before turning to our tax policy
inquiry. First, if tax rules allow us to structure our affairs to achieve
the same economic result at a lower tax cost, we generally will
do so. The physical presence test is a rule that allows this type
of "planning" in ways unanticipated by the Quill Court. These
planning opportunities might be even greater if the Court adopted
the physical presence test for corporate income taxes.30' In future
Supreme Court litigation, taxing authorities would be well-advised
to create a record that demonstrates this cost of adopting a physical
presence test for income tax nexus.
A second and related observation is that income tax rules tend to
track economic substance more than sales and use tax rules. °2 The
reasons for this are not entirely clear and may be as much historical
as logical. Nevertheless, Quill's physical presence test and the
distinction between a use tax collection obligation and a direct sales
tax liability are prime examples of sales and use tax formalism at
work. In contrast, the income tax cases reflect a certain fidelity to
economic substance. The Court might get it wrong from time to
time, as do we all, but it does appear to struggle toward an eco-
nomically substantive result. Accordingly, it is reasonable to expect
a similar approach to the problem of state corporate income tax
jurisdiction.
III. ECONOMIC NEXUS AND TAX POLICY: SHOULD STATES ASSERT
THEIR POWER TO TAX CORPORATIONS THAT HAVE "MERE"
ECONOMIC PRESENCE?
The conclusion so far has been constitutional/legal: states have
jurisdiction to impose an income tax on corporations that have an
in-state economic presence even though they may not have a
physical presence. The public policy question remains: should states
exercise this power?
the 'minimum contacts' with a taxing State as required by the Due Process Clause, and yet
lack the 'substantial nexus' with that State as required by the Commerce Clause." Id. at 313.
Logically implicit in this statement is that minimum contacts can be sufficient under the
Commerce Clause in some cases.
301. See generally Pomp, supra note 5, at 50-53 (describing ascendancy of the state and
local tax planning profession in the past decade). See also infra notes 354-55, 359-68 and
accompanying text (explaining common income-shifting techniques).
302. Supra notes 259-65 and accompanying text.
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A. The Economic Goals of Tax Policy: Equity, Efficiency, and
Administrability
Questions of tax policy are generally addressed with reference to
three overarching values: equity, efficiency, and administrability. °3
In turn, each of these values invokes various sub-themes. For
example, there are several approaches to equity. One approach is
"benefits-received" taxation, which is based on the notion that a tax
should be a price paid for a government service rendered.3 ' A
weakness of this approach is that what often makes a government
service a government service (i.e., a public good) is the difficulty of
measuring or pricing the benefit provided to each individual or
entity.3'5 Further, benefits-received taxes cannot be used to finance
government's distributional programs. Asking transfer payment
recipients to finance their own payments would result in a pointless
circularity. °
Early theorists such as Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill
recognized these limitations of the benefits-received model and took
the pragmatic view that taxes are a necessary evil: a sacrifice we
make for the common good, to support desired public expenditures,
and, more generally, to live in a civilized society. 7 Under this view,
303. See generally RICHARD W. TRESCH, PUBLIC FINANCE: A NORMATIVE THEORY332-33 (2d
ed. 2002). Tresch subdivides efficiency considerations into static efficiency (minimizing dead-
weight loss) and dynamic efficiency (promoting long-run growth), and he adds a flexibility
objective, which is usually associated with macro-economic planning and stabilization policies
at the national level. Id. See also JOHN L. MIEELL FISCAL ADMINISTRATION: ANALYsIS AND
APPLICATIONS FOR THE PUBLIC SECTOR 278 (4th ed. 1995) (paying attention also to revenue
raising potential); John A. Swain, The Taxation of Private Interests in Public Property: Toward
a Unified Theory of Property Taxation, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 421, 435-40 (2000) (synthesizing
approaches of several economic texts).
304. See TRESCH, supra note 303, at 179-84; STEPHEN G. UTZ, TAX POLICY: AN
INTRODUCTION AND SURVEY OF THE PRINCIPAL DEBATES 28-29 (1993).
305. See U17, supra note 304, at 29 (summarizing practical and theoretical hurdles to
implementing benefit taxation).
306. TltSCH, supra note 303, at 180. This being said, public finance theorists generally
agree that state and local governments are less capable of implementing distributional
policies because of the relative openness of their economies and the consequent ability of
people and capital to "vote with their feet." See, e.g., PAUL E. PETERSON, CITY LIM1TS 104-06
(1981) (describing limits of urban fiscal policies and the competition among suburban
localities).
307. JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLrTCAL ECONOMY 167-68 (Oxford Univ. Press
1998) (1848); RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND
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the sovereign has clear normative authority to impose broad-based
taxes to fund its operations-it is not a mere seller in a marketplace
of public goods."8 Thus, the fundamental question is "how the
government should ask people to sacrifice?"3"c By their ability to pay
is the dominant view.310
The ability to pay approach to tax equity is usually addressed by
reference to horizontal equity and vertical equity.3 " Horizontal
equity is achieved when persons with the same ability to pay indeed
do pay the same taxes.1 2 Similarly, the principle of vertical equity
allows persons with unequal abilities to pay to bear unequal tax
burdens.313
The exploration of the tax policy goal of economic efficiency can
be quite complex.1 4 Economists generally view taxes as necessarily
distorting economic behavior and resulting in economic in-
efficiencies. 3 5 Thus, the goal of good tax policy is to minimize the
interference of a tax with the economic decisions that would be
made in an otherwise efficient market.1 6 An example of tax
inefficiency is the predominant state sales and use tax pattern of
PRACTICE 228-32 (4th ed. 1984); ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF
THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 361-62 (Encyclopedia Britannica 1952) (1776).
308. See supra note 307.
309. TRESCH, supra note 303, at 334.
310. Id. at 334-35.
311. Id.; see also RICHARD D. POMP & OLIVER OLDMAN, 1 STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 6-9
to 6-12 (4th ed. 2001) (discussing vertical and horizontal equity in context of consumption
taxes, which, along with the income tax, is a quintessential ability to pay tax).
312. Determining the proper measure of who has an equal ability to pay is challenging,
complex, and controversial. The best candidates are income and consumption. See TRESCH,
supra note 303, at 338.
313. Again, who should bear a greater tax burden, and how much, is a topic fraught with
complexity and disagreement. See, e.g., MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 307, at 240-43
(explaining that the case for progressive tax rates is 'quite inconclusive"; there is "no intuitive
conclusion" about whether and to what degree progressive tax rates are desirable; and
"[m!atters are even less predictable under the equal proportional sacrifice rule").
314. This is the primary focus of the major public finance texts. For exhaustive discussions,
see MIXESELL, supra note 303; MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 307; TRESCH, supra note
303. For a discussion directed toward law students and lawyers, see UTZ, supra note 304.
315. See MIKESELL, supra note 303, at 294-95. Taxes are almost always inefficient because
they impose an added cost on economic activity. See id. One exception might be a property tax
measured solely by land value, because the supply of land is completely inelastic. Owners of
land are compelled to put land to its most economically efficient use regardless of the level of
taxation. See generally HENRY GEORGE, PROGRESS AND POVERTY ch. IV (1887) (advocating land
taxation as a panacea to social and political ills).
316. See MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 307, at 225.
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taxing sales of goods but not services.31 This creates an artificial
preference for services, distorting otherwise efficient economic
behavior."'8 This aspect of efficiency is sometimes called neu-
trality.1 9 Horizontal equity and neutrality are closely related.32
Taxing like persons and transactions differently usually will violate
both horizontal equity and neutrality.31 Tax rules that give rise to
tax motivated transactions and alter the method by which people
would otherwise do business also hamper efficiency. 322 A simple
example is the inefficiency of a person driving an extra five miles to
cross a state line to avoid sales tax. A physical presence nexus
standard encourages similarly inefficient corporate behavior. 23
Administrability is probably the most easily understood tax policy
value.324 A tax should be easy to administer and pay.325 As the diffi-
culty of either increases, so too do efficiency losses, losses from tax
avoidance behavior, and losses from the inability of the tax collector
to effectively collect revenue. But note the trade-off between equity
317. See JOHN F. DUE & JOHN L. MIKESELL, SALES TAXATION: STATE AND LOCAL STRUCTURE
AND ADMINISTRATION 83-85 (1983).
318. See POMP & OLDMAN, supra note 311, at 6-21 to 6-24 (exploring lack of normative
foundation for sales tax exemption for services).
319. The decision to impose any tax usually violates the neutrality principle. A tax on
income favors leisure; a tax on consumption favors savings. However, once the decision is
made to impose, say, an income tax, the tax should be designed to interfere as little as
possible with how income is earned unless a conscious policy choice has been made to do so
(e.g., to favor capital gains over current income to encourage savings and investment). POMP
& OLDMAN, supra note 311, at 6-12 to 6-13.
320. Id.
321. For example, violating neutrality would be a nexus rule that allows state A to tax
businesses with substantial sales to state A customers but denies state A the power to tax
similar businesses simply because the business lacks the physical presence of an employee
or leased office. See infra Part III.B.1 (presenting more precise case for this example).
322. MIKESELL, supra note 303, at 294-95. Although the individual taxpayer is economically
motivated to engage in tax avoidance planning, the devotion of economic resources to these
activities and the associated opportunity costs are wasteful and decrease overall wealth and
welfare.
323. See infra Part III.B.2.
324. The "transaction costs" of tax administration to beth the tax collector and the taxpayer
have long been recognized. Adam Smith admonished that the levying of a tax should not
"require a great number of officers, whose salaries may eat up the greater part of the ... tax."
SMITH, supra note 307, at 362. From the taxpayer's perspective, Smith observed: "[Bly
subjecting the people to the frequent visits and the odious examination of the tax-gatherers,
it may expose them to much unnecessary trouble, vexation, and oppression." Id.
325. TRESCH, supra note 303, at 332.
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and administrability.326 A complex set of rules is often required to
accurately delimit a class of similarly situated taxpayers or
transactions. The Internal Revenue Code is replete with examples
of the complexity caused by trying to ensure that only the "right"
person or transaction is taxed.327 Complexity leads to collection and
compliance difficulties.328 Compliance and enforcement costs, of
course, cannot be entirely eliminated, but they should be reduced so
long as equity and efficiency are not too greatly compromised.329
B. The Tax Policy Benefits of Economic Nexus
1. Equity: Ensuring that All Corporations Benefitting from a
State's Market Are Subject to Tax
An economic presence test promotes equity by ensuring that all
corporations that benefit from a state's market are subject to tax on
their income from that market. Persons with income sourced to a
state are, indeed, taxed by the state. All persons selling goods or
services to in-state customers are subject to the state's income tax
regardless of the essentially arbitrary marker of an in-state office or
employee. To be sure, under the prevalent state apportionment
formulae, the presence or absence of in-state property or personnel
would affect the percentage of income sourced to the state, but
absence of these factors would not deny the state jurisdiction to tax
326. See WHLIAM D. POPKIN, FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INcOME TAX LAw § 1.07 (4th ed.
2002) (exploring types and causes of federal income tax complexity).
327. See, e.g., id. §§ 1.05-06 (demonstrating complexity of targeting earned income and
child credit to low income individuals).
328. As Professor Popkin observes:
In some situations ... complexity can so befuddle the IRS that taxpayers with
good tax advisors can avoid taxes, either because government auditors are no
match for taxpayer counsel or there is no audit in the first place. The result is
tax inequity, as the rules are avoided by some but not all taxpayers.
Id. § 1.07.
329. Quill can be criticized on tax policy grounds because it merely substituted one
administrative issue (taxpayer compliance burden) for another (impracticality of enforcing the
use tax against each individual purchaser), while rendering the sales tax non-neutral and
horizontally inequitable by creating a de facto exemption for remote sellers. The Court chose
to leave tax policy to Congress, because Congress could enact legislation that would preserve
the states' power to tax remote sellers (and thus promote equity and efficiency) while reducing
compliance burdens. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 318 (1992).
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if the taxpayer has in-state sales.3 0 Thus, similarly situated busi-
nesses are taxed, but the amount of income that is taxed is still
determined by the level of in-state presence.
Lobbyists for corporate interests sometimes object that non-
physically present taxpayers receive no benefits from the state.33 '
330. For example, under the three-factor UDITPA apportionment formula, a company with
1/4 of its sales in-state, but no in-state property or payroll would have 0.0833% (1/12) of its
income apportioned to the state ((0.25 + 0 + 0)/3 = 0.0833). A business with 1/4 of its sales in-
state and with 1 of its 100 employees in-state would have 0.0867% of its sales apportioned to
the state ((0.25 + 0 + .01)13 = 0.0867). See supra notes 196-98 and accompanying text
(explaining UDITPA basics).
331. See, e.g., COUNCIL ON STATE TAXATION, JURISDICTION TO TAX-CONSTITUTIONAL,
POLICY POSITION OF 2001-2002, Mar. 1, 2001, at http://www.statetax.org/ (suggesting that
businesses not "present" in a jurisdiction and "therefore not receiving any benefits and or
protections from the jurisdiction, should not be required to pay tax to that jurisdiction."). The
policy statement clarifies that "present" means "physically present." Id. The Council on State
Taxation ('COST") is the leading state tax organization representing business taxpayers. See
also Internet Tax Fairness Act of 2001: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and
Admin. Law of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 6-13 (2001) (statement of Arthur R.
Rosen, Chairman, Coalition for Fair and Rational Taxation) [hereinafter Statement of Rosen].
Rosen attempts to refute the notion that states are providing benefits to remote sellers. First,
he suggests that the benefits provided to the remote seller are limited to highways, police
protections, and the like. Id. at 12. Rosen argues that because the immediate beneficiaries of
these services are the seller's delivery media (e.g., telecommunications or trucking companies)
and because these media are in-state taxpayers, it would be duplicative to tax the out-of-state
seller. Id. An obvious flaw in Rosen's argument is that it ignores that the out-of-state seller
receives benefits in excess of what is provided to its delivery media. For example, not only
does the state protect the trucks, it protects the remote seller's goods. Further, the state
provides a legal system that allows the remote seller to enforce the trucking company's
obligation to deliver goods rather than abscond with them. This same legal system protects
the seller's right to enforce the obligations of its customers. Numerous other protections and
benefits could be identified that extend beyond mere delivery of the product. Second, Rosen
argues that both buyers and sellers benefit and are burdened from their transactions in equal
proportions (buyers part with money and sellers part with goods or services). Id. at 12-13.
Accordingly, there is no "balance due" at the end of the transaction to either the buyer's state
or the seller's state. Id. If there were, he argues, then states could ask buyers to pay tax to the
state of origin because they benefit from the remote state's maintenance of an orderly society
that allows goods and services to be produced for export. Id. Thus, it is implied, the benefits
argument proves too much because we do not treat buyers as taxpayers in the state of origin.
The refutation of this argument is threefold. First, there is a "balance due" to government.
Taxes are what we pay to live in a society that allows a market to operate in the first instance.
Like it or not, the government is a "silent partner" in the economy (one that often is not
appreciated until it ceases to function). Second, the benefits argument does not prove too
much. In the context of taxes on either net income or business receipts, which is what Rosen
is addressing, customers in the state of destination would not be taxpayers in the seller's state
simply because the customers have no net income or business activity sourceable to that state.
In the sales and use tax context, it indeed would be constitutionally permissible for the state
of origin to impose a sales tax on the transaction, which the seller would pass on to the buyer,
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Although this point of view may have some political cache, it is
factually unsupportable and has not been voiced by disinterested
observers.332 Simply put, a remote seller could not do business in a
lawless society. Indeed, a seller in a lawless society would be
compelled to be physically present to enforce the obligations of the
buyer and to ensure the safe delivery of its product. Remote
commerce can only exist in an orderly society in which government
has undertaken these functions on behalf of all beneficiaries of that
orderly society, including remote sellers. 333
Sometimes the "no state benefit" argument seems to take the
form of a strict benefits-received theory of taxation.334 The corporate
interest lobbyists do not so much argue that no benefits are re-
ceived, but that the benefits are disproportionate to the tax that
would be imposed; that because the seller has provided a valuable
good in exchange for the money received by the customer, the seller
has already paid for these benefits; that because the common carrier
delivering the goods and the customers are local taxpayers, taxing
but most states choose not to do so. Sales and use taxes are consumption taxes, and so the
state of consumption is usually considered the proper jurisdiction to impose the tax. Third,
note how the argument has shifted from "no benefits are received" to "yes, benefits are
provided, but this is not a sufficient basis to impose a tax in all instances." Agreed. Usually
it is the tax policy criterion of administrability that prevents us from pushing the benefits
notion to the outer limits. So we have come full circle. The claim that the state provides no
benefits is really a specie of the tax policy (and Burdens Quill) concern of the compliance costs.
It is not that no benefits are provided, it is that the administrative burdens can sometimes
outweigh the benefits. Reasonable minds can disagree on where the line is drawn, but the
claim that a state provides no benefits to a remote seller is without merit. See infra note 332
(the Quill Court dismisses this argument in holding that the state taxation of remote sellers
did not violate due process, finding that remote sellers benefit from the market state).
Finally, Rosen argues that states misunderstand federalism. See Statement of Rosen,
supra, at 11-12. States are responsible for "state-level" issues and the federal government is
responsible for issues that affect "the American economy as a whole." Rosen implies that if
a party receives benefits from the American economy as a whole then any related obligations
are owed to the federal government and not the states. See id. This is simply another version
of the no benefits argument addressed above. It presupposes that remote sellers do not benefit
from the market state. As demonstrated, this is not the case.
332. As a legal matter, the lack of benefit claim is primarily a due process challenge that
the Quill court unequivocally answered in favor of the state. Quill, 504 U.S. at 308. The Court
held that there is "no question" that economic exploitation of the state's market provides
adequate due process grounds for the imposition of tax, in part because of "the benefits [the
taxpayer] receives from access to the State." Id.
333. See supra notes 331-32 (refuting the "no state benefits" argument).
334. See supra note 331 and accompanying text.
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the seller company would be duplicative; or some similar quid pro
quo analysis.335
Even if these objections were supportable, which is doubtful,336
the simple answer is that the normative basis for corporate in-
come taxation is ability to pay, not benefits received. Income taxes
are a quintessential ability to pay tax. 337 Accordingly, the corporate
income tax need not be justified on the grounds that it is a reason-
able approximation of a purchase price for government services.338
The taxpayer's exploitation of the state's market is sufficient
justification. If it is, then it is benefitting from the state's govern-
ment and the state can legitimately ask it to pay taxes on the net
income earned in the jurisdiction. 331 If proponents of the benefits-
received argument persist by claiming that benefits-received rather
than ability to pay is the proper normative basis for the state-level
corporate income tax, then they prove too much. If their argument
had merit then it would be grounds to object to the corporate income
tax generally, physical presence or not.3 °
335. See supra note 381.
336. See supra notes 273-80 (explaining fallacies of these various objections to the income
taxation of remote sellers).
337. See TRESCH, supra note 303, at 338-52 (noting that income and consumption taxes are
the "two main contenders" for the measuring ability to pay as measured by utility).
338. It is probably more accurate to say that the corporate income tax is a "second-best"
solution to inequities in the individual income, which is an ability to pay tax. Thomas F.
Pogue, State and Local Business Taxation: Principles and Prospects, in THE FTURE OF STATE
TAxArION 95 (David Brunori ed., 1998). It is axiomatic that taxes on businesses are ultimately
borne by individuals: employees, customers, suppliers, and owners. Under our current tax
system, retained corporate earnings are not taxed to shareholders until the shares are sold,
and shareholders escape taxation entirely if the shares are held at death. Id. at 96.
Immediately taxing corporate earnings tends to iron out this anomaly. Ideally, corporate
earnings would be taxed to shareholders in the year they accrue, as occurs, for example, in
the case of partnerships, limited liability companies, and subchapter S corporations. This
system would avoid the double taxation of dividends for companies that annually pay out a
portion of their earnings. See generally id. at 95-97 (explaining the role of business taxes in
augmenting direct taxes).
339. See supra note 331 (discussing the benefits-received argument in greater detail). As
a constitutional matter, such taxes must meet the four-pronged Complete Auto test. See supra
Part I.A. However, apart from the issue of nexus, addressed in Parts I and II, there is no
serious claim that state corporate income taxes violate this test. The Court acknowledged, in
effect, the ability to pay rationale of taxation in Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453
U.S. 609, 623-24 (1981). See also supra note 85 and accompanying text; supra note 332
(discussing the Quill Court's holding that a remote mail-order company benefits from the
state whose market it exploits).
340. A meaningful challenge of economic presence based on benefits-received grounds
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The other possible counterargument is that equity is not
enhanced by an economic presence rule because this rule only
determines to which states a corporation pays tax, not the overall
state tax income tax liability of the multistate corporation. 34' Every
corporation arguably will pay its fair share in the aggregate under
either nexus test, although an individual state might still claim that
it is not getting its fair share of tax. The difference between
economic and physical nexus is simply where the tax is paid. Thus,
horizontal equity among taxpayers is preserved under either
nexus test. This counterargument is plausible only if the heroic
assumption were true that all states have identical and comple-
mentary income tax rules.342 Perhaps sadly, this is not the case.343
State income tax rates vary, some states do not impose a corporate
income tax, many states do not require combined reporting, and
some states do not have throwback rules.3"
To illustrate, assume that Xco has neither property nor payroll in
state A but makes thirty percent of its sales to customers in state A.
All of Xco's property and payroll are in state B, and it makes
seventy percent of its sales to customers in state B. State B does not
require Xco to throwback its sales in non-nexus jurisdictions to the
would have to include an attack on the current apportionment formulas, all of which include
receipts factors. For example, if a company has no physical presence but $10 million in sales
into a state, the company would not be taxable under a physical presence test. The company
arguably receives no state benefits. If the company then hired one in-state employee, however,
its taxable income would be apportioned to the state based largely on the weight of the
company's in-state sales. It is difficult to explain how the physical presence suddenly makes
in-state sales a meaningful measure of benefits received if no benefits were received the day
before the employee arrived.
341. If all states apportioned income solely based on the UDITPA three-factor
apportionment formula then the sum of the apportionment ratios would be 1.0. The total
receipts, property and payroll would, in the aggregate, be the numerators of these factors as
well as the denominators (assuming no foreign activities). See infra notes 342-45 and
accompanying text, for a discussion of how receipts from non-nexus jurisdictions would have
to be "thrownback" to nexus jurisdictions to reach this result under a physical presence test.
342. The Court has called such state tax rules "internal[ly] consisten[t]." Container Corp.
v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 169 (1983). At minimum this would require that all states
have the same rate and base, combined reporting, and rules that throwback receipts in non-
nexus jurisdictions to the numerators of receipts factors in states that the taxpayer has a
physical presence.
343. See generally HELLEBSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 14, 1 9.01 (discussing state
variation from UDITPA); POMP & OLDMAN, supra note 20, at 10-18 (explaining throwback
rules and state variations).
344. Id.
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state B receipts factor numerator. State B uses the traditional
three-factor apportionment formula,345 and physical presence is
required for a state to impose its income tax. In this example, Xco
would pay no tax to state A because it is not physically present in
state A and would apportion ninety percent of its income to state B
((0.7 receipts factor + 1.0 property factor + 1.0 payroll factor) - 3).
This would leave ten percent of its income untaxed.
This is just the tip of the iceberg. A sizeable industry has
developed around exploiting the differences among state income tax
rules.3 Setting aside, for the moment, the inefficiencies of this tax
motivated planning and the overall loss of state revenue, such
"planning" undoubtedly affects horizontal equity adversely. Some
taxpayers will be able to exploit these seams in the state corporate
income tax fabric while others will not. Indeed, often the larger,
more highly capitalized businesses have the resources and expertise
to engage in such planning. Thus, those with the most ability to pay
may pay the least. 47
Economic nexus helps to minimize these manipulations because
changing where wealth is consumed is much more difficult than
changing where it is produced.3  In other words, moving property
or payroll around is easier than dictating the location of customers.
A corporation will rarely employ a tax planning strategy designed
not to make a sale. Thus, assuming that sales of goods and services
are sourced to the destination,3 49 an economic presence test will
345. See supra notes 196-98 and accompanying text (explaining the UDITPA three-factor
income apportionment formula).
346. See Pomp, supra note 5, at 59-66 (describing state "Tax Planning 101").
347. On the other hand, many smaller closely held companies are organized as pass-
through entities such as subchapter S corporations or limited liability companies. See supra
notes 163-64 and accompanying text. Therefore, these companies are not subject to entity
level income taxation. Even closely held subchapter C corporations often avoid corporate level
tax through salary or leasing arrangements.
348. Professor Fox demonstrates that under a physical presence nexus standard "firms are
encouraged ... to reduce their sales tax liability by concentrating their activities in a limited
number of low or zero tax rate states." Fox, supra note 4, at 42. Therefore, "Injeutrality can
be achieved only with an economic exploitation" sourcing rule. Idc at 41.
349. While regulations promulgated under UDITPA by the Multistate Tax Commission
generally source sales of tangible personal property to the destination state, services are
generally sourced to the jurisdiction where the "greater proportion of income producing
activit[iesl [occurred] ... based on costs of performance." MULTISTATE TAX COMM N,
ALLOCATION AND APPORTIONMENT REGULATIONS reg. IV.17 (2001), at
http'J/www.mtc.gov/UNIFORM/Genlala 72701.pdf [hereinafter MTC]. Compare MTC, supra,
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ensure that the destination state will be able to tax income
attributable to those sales. Planning around that tax consequence
normally will be impossible or impractical. If income is only taxed
where a business has a physical presence, however, then taxpayers
will be motivated to limit their physical presence to tax havens.
Thus, taxpayers will apportion a greater amount of their income
to tax havens, and even throwback rules will simply throwback
receipts to low tax jurisdictions.
In sum, equity is enhanced by economic nexus because economic
nexus ensures that similarly situated taxpayers are treated the
same, both within each state and nationally. Further, if a state's
right to impose a tax can be based on the ability to pay principle
(which is one aspect of equity analysis); and if the ability to pay
principle is predicated, in turn, on a state's entitlement to tax those
who benefit from the existence of that state government; then the
economic nexus argument receives high marks because entities
exploiting a state's market fall within the class of benefitted, and
therefore taxable, participants in that political community.
2. Efficiency: Minimizing Efficiency Losses and Discouraging
Tax Avoidance Transactions
As noted, equity and neutrality are closely correlated.50 Failure
to treat similarly situated taxpayers the same violates the neu-
trality principle and thus distorts economic behavior. Further,
efficiency losses result if tax rules encourage firms to engage in the
economically wasteful enterprise of rearranging their operations or
corporate structure solely to minimize their tax liability. 31 The
previous section demonstrated that economic presence nexus rules,
reg. IV. 15 (tangible personal property), with MTC, supra, reg. IV.17 (sales other than tangible
personal property). Some states, however, have adopted destination-based receipts factor
sourcing rules and the MTC. Several states have also adopted special rules for specific service
industries. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 290.191(5)(j) (West 1999 & Supp. 2003) (general market-
state approach); MTC, supru, reg. IV.18 (financial institution rules); HELLERSTEIN &
HELLERSTEIN, supra note 14, 11 10.02(2Xd), 10.06 (providing a detailed exposition and
analysis of market-state and financial institution division of income rules).
350. See supra note 320 and accompanying text.
351. See supra note 322 and accompanying text; see also Fox, supra note 4, at 42
(explaining that efficiency losses result from tax motivated manipulation of business activities
and location).
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coupled with a destination based receipts factor, minimize the
potential for these inefficient tax avoidance behaviors. This section
explores this strength of the economic presence test in greater
detail.
A single business can be organized as one corporation or it can be
multicorporate. If the economic activity of the business is the same,
then ideally it would be taxed the same regardless of the business'
formal structure. Some states recognize this economic reality by
requiring combined reporting: a multicorporate business engaged
in a "unitary business " 52 files a combined return and reports
income as a single entity, essentially ignoring its formal corporate
structure.3"' A majority of states, however, only provide for separate
entity reporting.354 One of the many defects of separate entity
reporting, particularly if coupled with a physical presence nexus
rule, is that it allows taxpayers to structure their operations to
artificially minimize net income in high tax states and to maximize
income in tax havens.5
The Geoffrey case illustrates both this tax planning technique and
how economic nexus thwarts it.356 Recall that Toys R Us created an
352. A constitutional predicate to the use of formula apportionment is that a multistate
business must be "unitary". See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm'r of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425,439 (1980)
('[Tihe lynchpin of apportionability... is the unitary-business principle."). This is true whether
the business is multicorporate or single entity. Thus, even a single corporation could be
operating two or more unitary businesses, in which case a separate return would be filed for
each unitary business for the purpose of formulary apportionment. See POMP & OLDMAN,
supra note 20, at 10-21, 10-30. The precise contours of a unitary business are much disputed.
In general terms, the Court has characterized a unitary business as one involving "functional
integration, centralization of management, and economies of scale."Mobil Oil Corp., 445 U.S.
at 438 (citing Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1942)).
353. See generally POMP & OLDMAN, supra note 20, at 10-30 to 10-37 (explaining combined
reporting); HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 14, 8.11 (explaining combined
reporting, its distinction from consolidated reporting, and its relationship to the unitary
business principle).
354. See POMP & OLDMAN, supra note 20, at 10-32.
355. A related problem is the administrative difficulty of establishing and policing transfer
pricing among corporate affiliates. For example, in Geoffrey, if the taxpayer had been
successful, his savings would have been measured by the price it set for the licensing of
intangibles to the South Carolina affiliate. See infra notes 356-63 and accompanying text for
explanation of Geoffrey.
356. Geoffrey, Inc. v. S.C. Tax Comm'n, 437 S.E.2d 13 (S.C. 1993); see supra note 228 and
accompanying text (discussing Geoffrey in connection with post-Quill state court income tax
nexus decisions).
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intangibles holding company in Delaware ("Geoffrey"). 7 Delaware
does not tax the income of intangibles holding companies.358
Geoffrey then licensed the use of its intangibles to Toys R Us
operating affiliates, including the affiliate located in South Carolina,
a separate entity to the state.359 The payment by the South Carolina
operating entity to the Delaware holding company was intended to
reduce South Carolina income by the amount of the payment.3 °
Moreover, the taxpayer hoped that South Carolina would apply a
physical presence nexus test, thereby finding that Geoffrey was
outside its jurisdiction to tax. Thus, Geoffrey's royalty income would
only be subject to tax in Delaware; therefore, it would not be taxed
at all.
In Geoffrey, however, the South Carolina Supreme Court dashed
the taxpayer's tax avoidance hopes by applying the economic
presence test, coupled with a destination-based sales factor.361 The
court held that Geoffrey was taxable in South Carolina despite its
lack of physical presence. 2 Further, the court held that Geoffrey's
licensing receipts were attributable to South Carolina, the state in
which Toys R Us used the intangibles. 3' Thus, the payment to
Geoffrey did not have the effect of exporting income-the income
stayed in South Carolina and was taxable to the economically
present entity that earned it.
Unfortunately, not all post-Quill state court decisions have
adopted the Geoffrey view, and several state courts have upheld the
intangibles holding company tax avoidance technique.3" Indeed, the
357. Geoffrey, 437 S.E.2d at 15. "Geoffrey" is the name of a fanciful giraffe that Toys R Us
uses to promote its stores.
358. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 1902(bX8) (1997 & Supp. 2002).
359. Geoffrey, 437 S.E.2d at 15. This is one sophisticated giraffe.
360. See id.
361. See id. at 18.
362. Id.
363. Id. at 19.
364. See, e.g., Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Comm'r of Revenue, 778 N.E.2d 504 (Mass. 2002)
(holding that the transaction had economic substance); ACME Royalty Co. v. Dir. of Revenue,
96 S.W.3d 72 (Mo. 2002) (en banc) (holding royalty payments received by out-of-state licensor
from affiliated Missouri licensee were not derived from Missouri sources under applicable
Missouri income tax statute). The ACME Royalty Court split 4-3 and its decision contains a
well-reasoned dissent criticizing the intangible holding company tax avoidance scheme:
The Missouri Director of Revenue aptly describes this recent trend in tax
avoidance: [A] bare corporate change can make income that is taxable today not
taxable tomorrow." The result is the creation of so-called "nowhere
38520031
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use of intangibles holding companies in this fashion has become a
common state tax planning device notwithstanding the Geoffrey
ruling."'
This tax avoidance opportunity would not have arisen if South
Carolina had been a combined reporting state.3' In a combined
reporting state, the holding company and the operating entity would
have been part of the larger Toys R Us combined group, and so the
inter-affiliate licensing transaction would have been ignored.367
Further, the amount of income apportioned to Delaware (and thus
away from other states) as a result of the creation of the holding
company would have been minimal because the Delaware receipts,
property, and payroll of the holding company would have been
relatively inconsequential.
The adoption by all states of combined reporting would be a
significant step toward reducing state tax motivated transactions,
but it would not obviate the need for an economic presence juris-
dictional standard. Even under a universal combined reporting
regime, the physical presence nexus test motivates taxpayers to
avoid physical presence in some jurisdictions while shifting property
income'-income that is taxed in no state.
"Nowhere income," it might be noted, is not just affecting individual states.
The Wall Street Journal reports that the Internal Revenue Service is also
concerned about loss of federal income tax. Companies set up offshore
subsidiaries so they can transfer royalties from sales of products made outside
the United States to places like Bermuda. Glenn R. Simpson, A New Twist in
Tax Avoidance: Firms Send Best Ideas Abroad, WALL ST. J., June 24, 2002, at
Al. The Journal reports that more than two dozen pharmaceutical and computer
companies have set up subsidiaries in Bermuda. Id. "The transfer of intellectual
property--such as trademarks and patents--has become so widespread that it
has prompted an aggressive crackdown by the Internal Revenue Service on
alleged abuses that one IRS consultant says could eventually involve tax claims
in the tens of billions of dollars." Id
By moving their profits to places where such income is not taxable, companies
are avoiding taxation in places such as Missouri where those profits were
derived.
ACME Royalty, 96 S.W.3d at 78 (Wolff, J., dissenting).
365. See ACME Royalty, 96 S.W.3d at 76-81; POMP & OLDMAN, supra note 20, at 10-33 to
10-35 (describing tax avoidance use of Delaware holding companies).
366. See Charles E. McLure, Jr., Legitimacy, Fairness, and Equity of State and Local Taxes
on Interstate Commerce, 22 ST. TAX NOTES 49, 50 (2001); supra notes 352-53 and
accompanying text.
367. See supra note 353 and accompanying text.
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and payroll to tax havens.s Of course, regardless of the applicable
nexus standard, differing tax rates will continue to create incentives
to load tax liability increasing activities into low tax jurisdictions.
The economic presence test, coupled with a destination-based
receipts factor, 69 dampens the effect of shifts in property and
payroll because the receipts factor ensures that at least some
income is apportioned to jurisdictions exploited by economically
present taxpayers. As noted, altering where goods are produced is
much easier than altering where they are consumed.7 0 Thus,
employing inefficient tax motivated strategies is both more difficult
and less rewarding when economic presence is the nexus standard.
Some might applaud the physical presence test as promoting
beneficial tax competition among the states. 71 Without entering into
368. See supra note 348 and accompanying text. Combined reporting, in effect, converts a
multicorporate unitary business to a single entity for tax reporting purposes. See supra notes
352-53 and accompanying text. Thus, all of the tax avoidance opportunities available to a
single entity (without separately reporting affiliates) are still available to a combined group.
Combined reporting takes away a potent weapon in the taxpayer's arsenal-the shifting of
income to affiliates in low tax jurisdictions and the separate incorporation of nexus creating
assets--but it does not take away the incentive to move productive assets to low tax
jurisdictions. Economic efficiency is not enhanced by production decisions motivated by tax,
rather than economic factors. See Fox, supra note 4, at 40-42.
369. A destination-based receipts factor rule is required so that receipts are attributed to
the market that the taxpayer is exploiting. If receipts were attributable to the state of origin,
then the receipts factor would be duplicative of the payroll and property factors, resulting in
the same distortive incentive to shift payroll and property into low tax jurisdictions. See supra
note 348 and accompanying text.
370. See supra note 348 and accompanying text.
371. Multistate businesses have been tremendous beneficiaries, at least in the short term,
of interjurisdictional tax competition. The "race to the bottom!-in which states compete by
offering tax incentive packages to businesses shopping for places to locate or relocate-has
been subject to extensive documentation and criticism. See generally Peter D. Enrich, Saving
the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints on State Tax Incentives for
Business, 110 HARV. L. REV. 377 (1996); Walter Hellerstein, Commerce Clause Restraints on
State Tax Incentives, 82 MINN. L. REv. 413 (1997); Walter Hellerstein & Dan T. Coenen,
Commerce Clause Restraints on State Business Development Incentives, 81 CORNELL L. REv.
789 (1996). On balance, commentators see this phenomenon as harmful to the general
welfare, as businesses make location decisions based on noneconomic criteria and overall state
revenue collection is driven downward in a "negative sum" game. See, e.g., Melvin L. Burstein
& Arthur J. Rolnick, Congress Should End the Economic War for Sports and Other Businesses,
THE REGION, June 1996, at 35, 35-36, reprinted in 11 ST. TAX NOTES 111 (1996); McIntyre,
supra note 1, at 944-45 (referring to Figure 1, which documents recent "decline in-state
corporate tax revenues as a percentage of gross state product" and surmising that this trend
may be attributable in part to the "hollowling] out" of the base through companies' "tax
maneuvers").
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the complex debate of whether tax competition among jurisdictions
is beneficial, 372 it can be demonstrated that the physical presence
test does not enhance the sort ofinterjurisdictional competition that
might be claimed to be salutary. The basic argument for inter-
jurisdictional tax competition is that competition compels state and
local governments to be more efficient service providers. It allows
persons to "vote with their feet"373 and be present only in those
jurisdictions that offer the desired mix of government services and
taxes.374 The competition argument has two responses relevant to
nexus. On the one hand, even with an economic presence test,
taxpayers have an incentive to shift their presence to low tax
jurisdictions. 375 Thus, interjurisdictional competition still exists as
long as there are differentials in effective tax rates and there are
mobile factors of production. Perhaps this would promote that
"moderate" level of competition that some economists believe is
372. Modem speculation on the value of fiscal competition began with Charles Tiebout. See
Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956).
Tiebout, "the founding father of the mobility literature,* speculated that our federal system
would allow individuals to "vote with their feet' and live in jurisdictions that offer a
combination of services and taxes that would maximize individual utility and general welfare.
TRESCH, supra note 303, at 855-56. Tresch notes that "'t] he literature on mobility ... is among
the largest in all of public sector economics," but that literature "has generally not supported
Tiebout's conjecture.' Id. at 856. As a constitutional, political, and historical matter, the
destructive consequences of fierce competition among the states was a prime impetus for the
formation of the United States and the adoption of a federal constitution. See UTZ, supra note
304, at 221 (recognizing the limits of the Tiebout conjecture and exploring a middle ground
approach modeled by the European Community.). Id. at 219-22; see also infra note 374.
373. TRESCH, supra note 303, at 856.
374. See Tannenwald, supra note 2, at 154-56 (summarizing both the deleterious effects of
interjurisdictional tax competition and the academic arguments supporting competition "in
moderation"). One interesting counterargument to the benefits of competition is that public
goods by definition extend beyond goods and services that can be sold to each beneficiary for
a discrete "price" while excluding from those services persons who do not pay for them.
Further, government necessarily must pursue some distributive tax and spending policies,
and these by definition cannot be "charged back' to the beneficiaries. See supra notes 304-05
and accompanying text (explaining the challenges to state and local governments of imposing
taxes based on benefits received). Thus, taking the competitive model to its logical conclusion
would result in state and local governments being reduced by competition to becoming sellers
ofprivate goods and services, left unable to do those things that are essentially governmental.
Furthermore, governments require somewhat of a captive audience to remain governments
and retain their sovereignty. The author is grateful to Professor Michael McIntyre for this
suggestion.
375. See supra note 368 and accompanying text.
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beneficial.376 On the other hand, the benefits (if any) of inter-
jurisdictional tax competition are not supported by a rule (the
physical presence test) that denies states the power to tax
economically present entities. Allowing a taxpayer to lurk in tax
haven A while exploiting the economy of state B makes the taxpayer
a free-rider in state B. This cannot be supported by a theory ex-
tolling the competitive market-like benefits of tax competition on
the premise that taxpayers are making choices about which mix of
government services to purchase.377 The prevention of shoplifting is
what makes a market work, and the associated compliance costs are
a necessary evil.
3. Administrability: Promoting Tax Policy Goals Under a
Workable Standard
Administrability has two components, ease of enforcement and
ease of taxpayer compliance.3" Taxpayer compliance burdens are
by now an old friend, being a focus of our earlier constitutional
analysis. 379 However, the conclusion that corporate income tax
compliance burdens do not conflict with the dormant Commerce
Clause does not fully answer our tax policy inquiry. Meeting
minimum constitutional standards does not, per se, result in the
best tax policy.
Compliance burdens are the last refuge for those who advocate a
bright-line physical presence test. The fewer the jurisdictions with
taxing authority, the less the compliance burden, and the bright-line
of physical presence undoubtedly aids in determining whether a
376. See supra note 374 and accompanying text.
377. Cf Fox, supra note 4, at 47 n.19 (arguing that the public choice argument is not
implicated when there is simply a shift in "tax structure," not "the overall tax level*).
378. See TRESCH, supra note 303, at 332. The focus in state tax constitutional litigation is
largely on the compliance costs to the taxpayer, but the tax enforcement side of the coin is
equally important from a policy perspective. Recall, for example, that the use tax collection
obligation challenged in Quill arose because of the administrative impracticality of enforcing
the use tax against each in-state purchaser. See supra note 38-39. It is worth considering
whether an economic nexus test would facilitate tax enforcement by reducing the tax
avoidance opportunities that arise under a physical presence test. See supra notes 322, 367-68
and accompanying text. This having been said, this section focuses on the taxpayer
compliance side of the coin.
379. See supra Parts I.B and II.B.
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taxpayer has nexus with a state."s The problem with this argument
is that the physical presence test completely sacrifices the other tax
policy values of equity and efficiency and makes states vulnerable
to numerous accounting "shenanigans.""8 '
Tax compliance always has costs. The tax policy question is how
to minimize these costs while furthering the other tax policy values
of equity and efficiency? At the margin, this requires trade-offs
among these values. Complicating the analysis is the constitutional
and political value of federalism. If one were creating a corporate
income tax system from scratch and aware that many corporations
do business nationally and internationally, one would probably
propose a national or international tax collection system rather than
fifty or more state systems. Our federal political structure, however,
is one of the immutable restraints on any tax compliance
mechanism that is proposed.8 2
Those serious about easing compliance burdens should look for
rules that preserve the benefits of economic presence while mini-
mizing the costs. The most sensible approach lies in seizing upon
the obvious connection between nexus with the taxpayer and nexus
with the income. The three-factor UDITPA formula is a time-
honored and constitutionally blessed approach to income allo-
cation.' If a taxpayer has in-state receipts, property, or payroll,
then its income is apportionable to the state.3 84 The obvious next
step would be a rule providing that if there is nexus with the income
(i.e., if the income is apportionable to the state), then there is
nexus with the taxpayer. The only exceptions would be (1) the
rare instances in which due process is offended, and (2) where the
380. Still, it is naive to think that a physical presence test resolves all ambiguities. See
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 331 (1992) (White, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("[Ilt is a sure bet that the vagaries of physical presence' will be tested to
their fullest in our courts.").
381. McIntyre, supra note 1, at 946. The article examines state corporate income tax
avoidance techniques and their effect on the integrity and long-term viability of the tax. See
id. at 944-47.
382. Professor Shaviro makes the case for dramatically reducing the power of the states
to structure their own tax systems, proposing that Congress take a much more activist role.
See Daniel Shaviro, An Economic and Political Look at Federalism in Taxation, 90 MICH. L.
REV. 895, 952.54 (1992). Even this extreme proposal, however, is grounded in the acceptance
of our federal system.
383. See supra notes 196-98 and accompanying text (explaining UDITPA basics).
384. See supra notes 196-98 and accompanying text.
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amount of income apportionable to the state is de minimis, causing
the costs of collection and compliance to exceed the revenue that the
state would generate. Under this approach, a taxpayer with mere
economic presence (i.e., in-state receipts, but no property or payroll)
would have income tax nexus.
Economist Charles McLure has proposed such a factor presence
rule,3" and the Multistate Tax Commission (MTC) has drafted a
detailed "factor presence nexus standard" for practical appli-
cation.3" Under the MTC proposal, a taxpayer would be presumed
to have nexus with a state if the taxpayer has in-state receipts,
property, or payroll exceeding certain de minimis thresholds. The
thresholds are either (a) $50,000 of in-state property, $ 50,000 of in-
state payroll, or $ 500,000 of in-state receipts; or (b) a property,
payroll, or receipts factor of greater than twenty-five percent.37 A
385. McLure, supra note 366, at 49 (arguing that more than a de minimis amount of sales,
payroll or property should create nexus).
386. MULTISTATE TAX COMMN, FACTOR PRESENCE NEXUS STANDARD FOR BUSINEsS ACTIVIY
TAXES, 1 (approved Oct. 17, 2002), reprinted in POLICY STATEMENT 02-02: ENSURING THE
EQUITY, INTEGRITY AND VIABILITY OF STATE INCoME TAX SYSTEMS app. (amended Oct. 17,
2002), available at httpJ/www.mtc.gov/POLICY/Resolutions.html#TOPres [hereinafter MTC,
FACTOR PRESENCE NEXUS STANDARD].
387. Id. The MTC's proposed factor nexus standard provides, in pertinent part:
A. (1) Individuals who are residents or domiciliaries of this State and business entities
that are organized or commercially domiciled in this State have substantial nexus
with this State.
(2) Nonresident individuals and business entities organized outside the State
that are doing business in this State have substantial nexus and are subject
to [list appropriate business activity taxes for the state, with statutory
citations) when in any tax period the property, payroll or sales of the
individual or business in the State, as they are defined below in Subsection C,
exceeds the thresholds set forth in Subsection B.
B. (1) Substantial nexus is established if any of the following thresholds is exceeded
during the tax period:
(a) a dollar amount of $50,000 of property; or
(b) a dollar amount of $50,000 of payroll; or
(c) a dollar amount of $500,000 of sales; or
(d) twenty-five percent of total property, total payroll or total sales.
C. Property, payroll and sales are defined as follows:
(1) Property ....
(2) Payroll ....
(3) Sales counting toward the threshold include the total dollar value of the
taxpayer's gross receipts, including receipts from entities that are part of a
commonly owned enterprise as defined in [Subsection D(2)l.
D. (1) of which the taxpayer is a member, from
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factor nexus rule would create a bright-line nexus test based on
economic reality rather than on an arbitrary physical presence."'
This test would also remove the objection that an economic presence
(a) the sale, lease or license of real property located in this State;
(b) the lease or license of tangible personal property located in this State;
(c) the sale of tangible personal property received in this State as
indicated by receipt at a business location of the seller in this State or by
instructions, known to the seller, for delivery or shipment to a purchaser
(or to another at the direction of the purchaser) in this State; and
(d) The sale, lease or license of services, intangibles, and digital products
for primary use by a purchaser known to the seller to be in this State. If
the seller knows that a service, intangible, or digital product will be used
in multiple States because of separate charges levied for, or measured by,
the use at different locations, because of other contractual provisions
measuring use, or because of other information provided to the seller, the
seller shall apportion the receipts according to usage in each State.
(e) If the seller does not know where a service, intangible, or digital
product will be used or where a tangible will be received, the receipts
shall count toward the threshold of the State indicated by an address for
the purchaser that is available from the business records of the seller
maintained in the ordinary course of business when such use does not
constitute bad faith. If that is not known, then the receipts shall count
toward the threshold of the State indicated by an address for the
purchaser that is obtained during the consummation of the sale, including
the address of the purchaser's payment instrument, if no other address
is available, when the use of this address does not constitute bad faith.
(4) Notwithstanding the other provisions of this Subsection C, for a taxpayer
subject to the special apportionment methods under [Multistate Tax
Commission Regulations IV.18.(d) through )], the property, payroll and sales
for measuring against the nexus thresholds shall be defined as they are for
apportionment purposes under those regulations....
E.A State without jurisdiction to impose tax on or measured by net income on a
particular taxpayer because that taxpayer comes within the protection of Public Law
86-272 (15 U.S.C. § 381) does not gain jurisdiction to impose such a tax even if the
taxpayer's property, payroll or sales in the State exceeds a threshold in Subsection B.
Public Law 86-272 preempts the state's authority to tax and will therefore cause sales
of each protected taxpayer to customers in the State to be thrown back to those
sending States that require throwback. If Congress repeals the application of Public
Law 86-272 to this State, an out-of-state business shall not have substantial nexus in
this State unless its property, payroll or sales exceeds a threshold in this provision.
MTC, FACTOR PRESENCE NExus STANDARD, supra note 386, at 1-4.
388. The factor nexus proposal acknowledges that some multistate businesses will still be
protected by P.L. 86-272. Id. at 4; see also supra note 21 and accompanying text (reproducing
and explaining P.L.86-272). Repeal of this federal statute would be necessary to fully
implement an economic nexus approach to state corporate income jurisdiction. See MTC,
FACTOR PRESENCE NExus STANDARD, supra note 386, at 4.
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test reduces tax nexus analysis to a nebulous minimum contacts
inquiry.389
Although the adoption of factor nexus rules would significantly
reduce the administrative costs of determining jurisdiction to tax,
it would not address the difficulty of complying with the non-
uniform substantive tax rules of multiple jurisdictions. UDITPA has
been an important uniformity cornerstone for many years, but more
could be done. Perhaps the resurgence of interest in sales and use
tax uniformity reflected by the Streamlined Sales Tax Project will
provoke renewed efforts to achieve even greater corporate income
tax uniformity.39 Lack of uniformity strengthens the hand of
opponents of a sensible income tax nexus rule, who are urging




For more than a decade, state tax policy has been frozen in the
Quill headlights. Passing by in the fast lane have been relentless
economic and technological changes, followed closely by corporate
taxpayers and their clever tax planners. Change may be afoot. If
widely adopted, the Streamlined Sales Tax Agreement will bring
needed sales and use tax uniformity, and perhaps the judicial or
Congressional overruling of Quill. This Article has shown that
corporate income tax does not require such radical road clearing.
Quill's physical presence test is not a constitutional barrier to
corporate income tax jurisdiction, and the state income tax already
underwent its own "streamlining" years ago with the adoption of
UDITPA. State income tax authorities should confidently assert
their jurisdiction to tax economically present businesses. The
Constitution allows it, and good tax policy demands it.
But good tax policy demands more. Congress should repeal P.L.
86-272. Its safe harbors have no place in a modern economy. In
389. See Bucks & Katz, supra note 1, at 1038 (arguing that the proposal provides taxpayers
with "certainty" and "clarity" when determining whether they are subject to state income tax).
390. See supra note 117 and accompanying text (discussing the Streamlined Sales Tax
Project's attempt to create more uniform sales and use tax rules).
391. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (providing a discussion of business-backed
legislation that would extend the nexus protections of P.L. 86-272).
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exchange for repeal of P.L. 86-272, states should adopt uniform
nexus guidelines and more uniform substantive income tax rules.
The modern global economy and the political landscape demand
minimizing the compliance burden of reporting to multiple juris-
dictions. So too may the political landscape. Corporate taxpayers
have cautiously endorsed the Streamlined Sales Tax Agreement,
acknowledging the value of tax uniformity and conceding that
widespread adoption of the Agreement may be the demise of the
physical presence nexus test for sales and use taxes.392 However, the
quid pro quo for this endorsement is a demand for the radical ex-
pansion of P.L. 86-272."9' Finding a logic behind these inconsistent
positions is challenging, apart from the logic of horse trading. The
only plausible justification for expanding P.L. 86-272 is to protect
taxpayers from the compliance burden of state income tax reporting.
Thus, states would be wise to call the corporate bluff and further
enhance the uniformity of the state corporate income tax system.
Paradoxically, it is only by working together that states can pre-
serve their sovereign power to tax.
392. See supra note 117.
393. See Council on State Taxation, supra note 117, at 408 (conditioning support for
expanded sales tax nexus on further income tax nexus restrictions).
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